



AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LITURGY

Volume 1 Number 3 May 1988

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R. WESLEY HARTLEY
EDITOR

GRAHAM HUGHES
DAVID ORR, OSB
ASSISTANT EDITORS

AJL is the journal of the Australian Academy of Liturgy and exists to further the study of liturgy at a scholarly level and to comment on and provide information concerning liturgical matters with special reference to Australia. *AJL* is published each May and October.

ISSN 1030-617X

EDITORIAL

Two themes from the last issue of AJL are continued in this. Dr Sherlock brings the perspective of theology to bear on the question of language and liturgy and explores specifically the questions of language, gender and God, of Christology and of the Trinity. The debate about language will continue and as part of it AJL plans to publish reviews and responses to the new common texts from the English Language Liturgical Consultation and the Uniting Church's worship-book *Uniting in Worship*, both to be published later this year.

'Imagination and Liturgy' was the theme of the Academy's 1987 Conference. A solid philosophical base was provided for the participants by Dr van Hooff's paper 'Imagination as a way of human knowing'. Many disciplines contribute to the study and celebration of liturgy and here we have an example of how philosophy can provide grist for the liturgist's mill.

New areas also are brought to our attention in this issue. Can, or should, Christians celebrate the Passover? In fact, many Christians participate in a Seder meal but Fr Jenks suggests that this is inappropriate as part of the observance of Holy Week. The suggestion is based on 'a negative conclusion on the alleged paschal character of the Last Supper'.

The multicultural character of Australian society is much discussed and a wide variety of religious traditions contributes to that society. Fr Chryssavgis explores some of the results of the encounter between the Orthodox tradition and Australian culture. The presence of an old faith in a new land brings important perspectives for both.

This issue is the last for which Fr David Orr, OSB will be Assistant Editor. He shortly leaves for an extended period of study leave. As we wish him well we acknowledge the work he has done in helping to establish AJL. Fr Thomas Knowles, SSS, already well known to readers of AJL, will take over as Assistant Editor and we welcome him to the team.

R.W.H.

St Barnabas' College
Eastertide 1988

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GENDERED LANGUAGE IN CORPORATE WORSHIP or, Can we still pray 'Our Father'?

Charles Sherlock

Masculine language and imagery is causing considerable agony to many in the churches. Women often hear such usage as shutting them out, treating them as if they were not present. Many men feel such language divides them from their sisters in Christ. A growing literature is developing on the subject of sexist language generally, but it has only been in recent years that the language of liturgy has come under scrutiny.

It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of the issues involved, especially in reference to the 'imaging' of God in corporate public worship. It is important to realize that I am considering this topic not merely from the point of view of 'abstract' theology, but the way in which language affects the life of a congregation at worship. Sometimes this leads to 'conservative' conclusions, at other times to urging change. The paper owes a debt to the experience of being at Yale Divinity School for 1982, and the life of the congregation of St Augustine's Moreland, as well the books and articles read on the topic.

Part of the problem is English itself: it uses many more masculine pronouns than other languages, including biblical Hebrew and Greek, and the traditional language of theology, Latin. Some examples: the text 'God made "man" in his own image' (Gen 1:26) uses the word for 'humanity', not 'male person' — which changes a lot of popular ideas. 'Son of Man' likewise uses a generic word, *anthropos* (though 'son' is masculine). And I recently checked masculine language in the 1604 Canons, whose official version is the Latin. There are hundreds of occurrences of 'he', 'him' and 'his' in the English — but merely three in Latin! Such linguistic sex bias does make a difference.

The paper falls into four sections: some preliminary comments, then discussion in turn of the doctrines of God, Christology and the Trinity.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT LANGUAGE

a) *Language and Liturgy*

To begin it is necessary to say something about language in liturgy.¹ Many approach this only in terms of the explicit content of the words used, having primarily doctrinal considerations in mind. This is an important facet, but words function in broader ways than this — what does a congregation think is going on when it hears 'The Lord be with you', or hears an enthusiast exclaim 'Hallelujah', for example? This paper assumes that the actual function of words in liturgy is

more 'performative' than 'cognitive' language, although both elements are present.

Secondly, the context within which words are used matters. We are all familiar with occasions on which incongruous words are used — very personal testimony in an otherwise formal liturgy, or a 'thee' prayer in the middle of a modern-language service. The dynamics of a traditional building, with worshippers sitting in pews, singing metrical hymns, before robed clergy, are very different from those of an Easter dawn service on a hillside, for example. In the case under consideration, the context of liturgical language is often a congregation having a female majority, yet led by a male minister and with males predominating amongst those who participate actively and visibly. This will affect the way in which gendered language functions.

Thirdly, there are at least two levels of theological reflection going on in liturgy. What has been called the 'primary' level happens in one's unconscious self, the 'godly ruts' formed through years of experience. This inchoate level includes emotional responses, the aesthetic senses, the folk-religious taboos: it will have elements of both light and dark, ignorance and purity. It is at this level that most of us operate, unless we are jarred by something extraneous — which is generally necessary! What may be termed the 'secondary' level is our conscious reflection upon our experience in liturgy: again, this will have both helpful and difficult sides — I am not trying to say one level is 'better' than another. Such reflection is necessary, lest we slip into mere formalism or superstition, but if all we do liturgically is apparently at the 'secondary' then we may only be active at the rational level (or think we are!). The significance of this distinction will become apparent as we proceed.

Given these factors, there is no justification today, in my opinion, for maintaining masculine language when referring to the people of God — 'men of God', 'brothers' and so on need changing. (Similar comments apply to thoughtless use of colour-words with racial overtones — 'dark', 'white', 'red' can all offend.) It is a relatively simple matter to correct this, and to alter one's patterns of writing and speech. But this has been written about extensively, and is not the major concern of this paper.²

b) *Inclusive or Non-Exclusive Language?*

Removing language which does not include leads to what is usually called 'inclusive language', but I have a few reservations about this term. It is near impossible to use words which will include every hearer, but not so hard to avoid language which excludes. Thus I would prefer to speak of 'non-exclusive' or 'non-excluding' language. Put this way, we do not have to keep striving to include, but simply avoid excluding. We are left free to talk and communicate naturally, with a 'filter' applied negatively.

There are several reasons why I prefer the term 'non-exclusive' to 'inclusive'. First, to try to talk in a wholly inclusive way can lead to undue self-consciousness, and lead to saying nothing. This is of special importance in prayer, particularly when it is *ex tempore*. On the other hand, the term is sometimes used to indicate a participatory style in liturgy, one which seeks to include all present by the language used. This is excellent, but are there limits to such inclusiveness? Sometimes 'inclusive' language seems to extend to universalism and at times everyone seems included except traditional Christians! There is a genuine universal thrust to the Gospel, but it does not ignore the need to repudiate evil and evil-doers. These are important issues, but they are tangential to the main concerns of the present paper.

LANGUAGE, GENDER AND GOD

a) *Father God?*

As a first step, it should be noted that it is quite possible to avoid most — if not all — use of the masculine pronoun for God. Sentences can be rearranged, participles substituted for verbs, the relative pronoun used strategically, and the genitive of description employed. Or the word 'God' can be repeated (though there are some problems here, discussed below). Thus 'God loves you. He sent Jesus to save you' becomes 'God loves you. God sent ...'. Or 'God loves you, and sent Jesus ...', or 'sending Jesus ...'.

I am convinced, however, that much traditional God-language needs preserving — and complementing. For example, I do not see how 'Father' language can be avoided, if we are to remain true to the biblical witness (especially Jesus' distinctive use of such language for God). But much of the usage of 'Father' in contemporary prayer seems to me to miss the key New Testament sense, that we are concerned with 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ'. It is not 'Father' in the abstract, but the Father of the Son, to whom we pray. To obscure this is to tend towards patriarchal patterns that are unhelpful, both theologically and pastorally. 'Father' is never used in this abstract way in Scripture (though Eph 3:14 comes close): the 'Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man' is not only triply sexist, but theologically vapid. And pastorally, Freud and Feuerbach's critiques of 'Father-figure projection' need to be taken with full seriousness.

The maintenance of 'Father' language is trenchantly defended by Donald Bloesch: yet all he demonstrates is that some masculine language for God is unavoidable, not that all feminine language is to be rejected.³ I see no great problem *in theory* with 'Mother' terms being used for God as well as 'Father' ones. There are dangers in a liturgical context — e.g. 'fertility' notions being encouraged, especially in a setting where liturgy reinforces 'folk religious'

tendencies. I think this is what C.S. Lewis was getting at when he wrote that to pray 'Our Mother who are in heaven' would mean not merely a different understanding of Christianity, but no Christianity at all. Yet this fails to distinguish between what is dangerous or true *for me*, and what is dangerous or true *per se*. I believe that for many of my generation to pray 'Our Mother' may well evoke unbiblical notions of a fertility goddess at the *primary* level: but I also believe that because such prayer is unobjectionable at the *secondary* level, there may well come about a generation for which this is not a danger. And it needs to be remembered that there are Christians for whom 'Our Father' cannot operate at the primary level.

Others would prefer to eliminate all masculine-reference language about God, including terms such as 'Father', 'Lord', 'King', and 'Almighty' which may be held to have patriarchal connotations.⁴ To remove all these would eliminate the vast majority of biblical terms. Yet often the piling up of male, patriarchal and authoritarian metaphors in prayer and sermon is insensitive and pastorally damaging.

b) *God and Power*

A closely related issue is sensitivity to images of God concerned with power. I am generally in sympathy with this (it was my doctoral topic) but to eliminate 'Lord' from liturgical texts, for example, seems to me too drastic. One recent writer says 'The relationship between the Divine and humanity is not one of lordship; rather it is one in which God's unity, wholeness and mutuality is reflected in the world'.⁵ Though I understand what the person is trying to communicate, such statements nevertheless seem to me to undermine essential aspects of Christian faith: divine lordship undergirds, does not displace, genuine divine-human relationships. (I might add that I find AAPB Second Order's Sanctus a particularly bad example of unqualified power language: 'Holy Lord, God of power and might' does *not* mean today what 'Lord God of hosts' meant in Isaiah or Revelation.)

In fact militaristic images are *not* wholly removed (or transformed) in liturgical texts with an 'inclusivist' perspective I have seen and experienced: they still appear, but with the enemy changed. It needs to be remembered that some notable Old Testament women *were* 'militaristic' — Miriam, Deborah, Jael, and Esther for example. The question is not the imagery, but how and why it is used.

c) '*Masculine*' and '*Feminine*' Attributes

This is a particular aspect of the broader question of divine attributes. It is tempting to assign those linked with power to the 'masculine' side of God, and advocate that others such as source of life, or nurturer, be emphasized as giving a 'feminine' balance. There is some sense in this, as a first step, but it is presupposed that such attributes can/should be regarded as 'masculine' or 'feminine' in the

first place. The attempt to enrich our understanding of God can easily end up reinforcing role stereotyping.

This can be a problem for 'conservatives' as well as 'progressives'. Thus Bloesch writes that 'the living God transcends sexuality' — true. But the sentence goes on to say 'that *he* is neither male nor female, and that *he* encompasses masculinity and femininity within *himself*'.⁶ Why the thrice-used male pronouns, which will annoy the readers he is trying to convert — and contradict his theological claim? Worse is to come: 'God is not a man, but, for the most part, he chooses to relate himself to us as masculine'. True again — though the 'he' and 'himself' could easily have been omitted without change of meaning. But can we then say 'that the church constitutes the feminine dimension of the sacred'? He argues that the word 'spirit', while grammatically neutral, is used with masculine adjectives: also true, but how does this *exclude* any but masculine reference to the Spirit?

Bloesch seems to think that rejecting exclusively feminine language means upholding the exclusively masculine. He even argues that we should retain masculine pronouns for God, when they are much less frequent in the original biblical languages than in English, and can be largely avoided without any great problems. My complaint about Bloesch's defence of masculine language is summarized in the conclusion to his third chapter: 'He [God] designated himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit'. No argument at all (except for the unnecessary pronoun). But why does this entail 'and thereby excluded other designations, particularly those associated with goddess spirituality and the fertility cults'? What of titles such as 'Rock', 'Shepherd', and especially 'I Am Who I Am'? What of the risky mythological language used by the prophets (see Isaiah 51:9-11 especially)? Why must we choose between masculine or feminine language?

Elsewhere Bloesch appears to allow this, conceding that some 'feminine' language is used of God in Scripture, and suggesting some 'feminine-language' prayers himself — yet so that 'the controlling symbol is still God the Father, and the motherhood and sisterhood of God are therefore seen in relation to this primal symbol'. Perhaps this is a Freudian slip — but the adjective 'controlling' is what the whole problem is about. Is this vision of God still too shaped by power?

Yet there is much truth in Bloesch's claim that some feminists advocate a neo-mysticism which is both unbiblical and unChristian. The sovereignty and transcendence of God — attributes linked by many to 'maleness' — are cast aside in favour of immanent pictures such as 'womb of Being' — attributes linked to 'femaleness'. Since transcendence and immanence need to be kept together in describing God, metaphors having roots in either or both genders are inevitable: it should be a case of both-and, not either-or. Yet even here things may not be so easy: Ruether's preferred term 'God/ess' seems to me to be about as helpful as calling a woman presbyter 'priestess'.

As noted above, when language about God in public devotion becomes so restricted that one can say almost nothing, then the mystical way is inevitable. Yet this may lead away from the radically materialistic character of Christian faith, centred as it is upon an historical Christ, God incarnate crucified. 'Mysticism' can easily become unChristian, however, in many guises — false mysticism is not the exclusive preserve of those who sympathize with feminism.

On the other hand, some totally avoid any male language for God at all.⁷ From my experience and reading of some liturgies, it has struck me that, while I am sure it is generally unintended, there can come about a real danger in this. In endeavouring to avoid masculine-only language in prayer and creed, only the term 'God' is really useable. This means that a rather 'deistic' theology comes across in liturgy: the frequency of references to Christ is sharply reduced, as are relational words (since they are mostly gender-specific). The overall effect seems to be to 'de-Christianize' liturgy in favour of a more general merely 'religious' tone. This brings me to a second area of concern.

CHRISTOLOGY

a) *Humanity and Deity*

What are some implications of non-gendered language for the liturgical understanding of Christ? Again I use examples from *Out of Darkness* (which, I should explain, is a valuable contribution to liturgy, with many good ideas). There are sometimes (surprisingly) docetic tendencies, in the endeavour to disentangle the 'particularity' of Jesus' maleness from the 'generality' of the incarnation. To write of 'the crucified, risen and ascended Christ, who is at one with God and is neither male nor female' is rather odd. Some of the liturgies in the book so avoid calling Jesus 'man' — a substitute is 'God' sometimes — that the reality of his human nature is undermined. Other rewrites eliminate too much of the particular: for example, in 'While shepherds watched', 'in David's town' and 'of David's line' are replaced with 'Bethlehem' and 'royal line' respectively: this goes close to an unhistorical idealism.

At other times attempted rewrites lead to adoptionist tendencies. This is most clearly shown in the rewrite of the Nicene Creed (p 69): (pre-existent) 'Son' language is replaced by 'Child' once, 'Christ' twice, and 'Father' becomes 'Creator'. This is confusing, since 'Christ' is properly the office the incarnate Son took up, not a title for the eternal Word. Yet the clearly male term, 'begotten', is retained: we thus end up with 'begotten of God' (a rather Arian tone) yet 'one in Being with the Creator' (modalist in feel).

Going to the other side, we find Bloesch writing,⁸ 'the doctrine of the virgin birth tells us that not only did Jesus have no earthly father, but he also had no heavenly Mother (in contra-distinction to surrounding pagan religion)'. One cannot but agree: yet it is supposed to illustrate the point that we must not

'sexualize the relationship between God and Christ'. All it shows is that Christ had no 'heavenly Father' in this sense, either — as any dialogue with a Muslim about Jesus being the 'Son of God' will quickly show.

b) *The Maleness of Jesus*

This brings me to a brief consideration of the significance of Jesus' maleness.⁹ It has become common to point out that it was the Word's assumption of human nature which matters — it is Nestorianism to hold that the Word joined to a human (male) person. The Word came to save, and thus reveal God's nature, not the other way around. This turns the edge somewhat, but I have become uncomfortable in recent times. The Patristic formula is 'what is not assumed is not healed'. Today this would seem to raise problems: Jesus was clearly a male person, so does this mean that female humanity is not saved? To what extent can women 'feel' in liturgy that a man is their saviour? Or is this pushing the sense of the Word's identification too far? After all, Jesus was not a Gentile, yet salvation has come to many of these.

Discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but there are some important liturgical consequences. It is important not to move away from the particularity of Jesus' maleness, or we begin to lose the particularity of the Gospel in favour of an ahistorical idealism. Tennis argues effectively that trying to portray Jesus' person in 'androgynous' terms will not do either: this removes him from both men and women, or (worse) speaks to us of a 'perfect human' who yet had a male body — which tells women they will always fall short.¹⁰

On the other hand, the New Testament presents the work of Jesus in terms which transcend gender stereotyping: it has both passive and active, strong and weak, emotional and rational sides — however these may be assigned to the 'feminine' or 'masculine'. He came to be the model of liberation for both women and men — and the 'breaker of models' (Tennis). Portraying Jesus as male in any sense which women perceive to exclude them must be rejected. And such portrayal includes that done by the 'imaging' of Christ in the person of the liturgical leaders themselves: males only in the sanctuary or pulpit says something less than godly about both God and Jesus.

A converse problem is seen in the use of 'romantic' language in hymns: 'he walks with me and he talks with me, and he tells me I am his own' for example. It is as if the worshipper is to 'fall in love' with Jesus. This is very difficult for most men, for whom such language is at best embarrassing, at worst raises the spectre of homosexuality. For women such language would seem to me to promote an unhealthy attitude of passive dependence. Theologically it confuses worship of the one divine-human person with worship of the humanity alone — the problem Cyril and the fifth-century Fathers wrestled with. But it leads into what seems to me to be the most pressing issue of all, gendered language and the doctrine of the Trinity.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

This doctrine is often considered to be the preserve of academic theologians. It is perhaps better understood as the church's rather stumbling answer to the question 'if Christ is God, what must God be like?' To say that God is a plain, undifferentiated oneness excludes our worshipping Jesus (which would then be idolatry, and entail human sacrifice). This most natural of Christian affections would then be replaced by a more general allegiance to a deity, or a general religious mysticism. The fundamental confession that God is a community of love is blurred. Thus the doctrine is of more than academic importance. (I am not arguing that all Christians should be able to exegete the Nicene Creed, but that it should be assumed, becoming part of the subconscious 'shape' of Christians' 'primary' theology.)

a) *Functional and Gendered Language*

But the doctrine inescapably involves masculine language. Baptism is into the Name of Father, Son and Spirit, as is blessing. And 'Father, Son, Spirit' is scriptural, difficult to change without changing meaning. Can it be dispensed with? I want to argue a two-fold thesis. Firstly, that we cannot eliminate gendered language from the doctrine of the Trinity without losing something fundamentally Christian. (I should note that I am not that bothered about which gender is used, as the discussion will show.) Secondly, that without this doctrine there is danger of greater 'patriarchal' distortion in liturgy. That is, the doctrine of the Trinity is necessary to liturgy for both 'conservative' and 'progressive' sides in the discussion of gendered language for God.

Some have suggested replacing the gendered with functional language: 'Maker, Christ, Holy Spirit', or 'Creator, Sustainer, Spirit'.¹¹ However there is a three-fold problem with these, it seems to me. Firstly, they are all non-personal (except 'Jesus', but to use this alongside 'Maker' confuses all sorts of issues, and there is too much 'Jesusology' around anyway). Whether we like it or not, gendered language is unavoidable if God is to be referred to in personal terms. Metaphors such as 'light', 'rock', 'One', etc. are all scriptural, but not the major witness, and regular use of these terms only will almost certainly result in a less than personal view of God being inculcated at the 'primary' level — the patterns ingrained by language hallowed through repeated use go very deep. (This is not to deny that many Christians have too human an understanding of God's 'person-ness'.)

Secondly, the trinitarian 'shape' of prayer is obscured. Christian prayer is most naturally offered to the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit (the eucharistic prayer being the classic example). This expresses the history of salvation within which we have found (or better, been found by) God. With language which can refer to any member of the Trinity (or none) an ahistorical, 'general' tone

prevails. The temptation to address prayer actually to the congregation rather than God grows, too.

Thirdly, all the suggested replacements for Father/Son/Spirit fall within 'economic' trinitarianism: that is, that God only acts as Father, Son, Spirit, not that God in some sense is Triune. There is nothing wrong with this some of the time — it is evident in the (Anglican) Catechism for example. But it falls far short if regarded as a replacement for 'essential' trinitarianism. If this is allowed then we avoid the deity of Christ: he merely acted as divine, or under divine (non-personal?) influence. Liturgy centred on such a view is becoming non-Christian: it raises issues such as the nature of Christ's Eucharistic presence, for example — is it the presence of God?. There may be difficulties in expressing the deity of Christ at the 'secondary' level, but it is fundamental at the 'primary'.

b) *Father/Mother, Son/Daughter?*

This last point is the theological crux. It is important to realize that the classical doctrine of the Trinity does *not* see 'Father' and 'Son' as literal terms. This was a familiar argument of the Arians: is 'Father' literal or metaphorical? If the former, the Son had a beginning, if the latter there is no reality behind the term 'Father' apart from reference to the Godhead as a whole — and so no reality behind the term 'Son'. The initial reply of the 'orthodox' was a bit *ad hominem* (but not merely *ad virem!*): if figs beget figs (in a vegetable manner), swine beget swine (in an animal manner), humans beget humans (in a human manner) — then God begets God (and in a divine manner).

The fuller, more positive reply was given by the Cappadochian Fathers (especially Gregory Nazianzen on this point). 'Father' and 'Son' are terms neither literal nor metaphorical, but express, by way of analogy, a relationship which is real. The base metaphor is 'begetting': this may be masculine (the male act of siring), but the qualifier 'eternal' removes the human particularity, and thus any *essentially* male basis to this. That is, it is not so much that the divine *arche* is Father, but that the eternal Origin-Word relationship can be likened to the act of begetting, qualified by the term 'eternal' (in the sense of both time and quality — endless, and of divine character). As noted above, 'Father' is not used in the abstract, but in relationship to the Word; similarly, 'Son' is not abstract, but used in relation the 'fount' of deity.

How necessarily masculine is this? In my opinion the base metaphor ('begotten' or 'sire') could probably be changed to 'give birth' without any great theological problem: 'eternally borne by the Mother'. The parallel between the eternal and temporal missions of the Word could be lost, however: it would not be as 'natural' to speak of the Incarnation as the birth of the Word through a human mother. The maleness of the incarnate Word, and the femaleness of Mary, the human through whom that Word entered the human sphere, is a given.

(It does not take much thought to realize that an incarnation via a human father alone would be impossible.)

However, does this exclude speaking of an eternal 'Mother-Son', 'Mother-Daughter' or 'Father-Daughter' relationship? (It should be remembered here that the Nicene Fathers in fact spoke on occasion of the Persons as 'It' to avoid this — and we in the West have lived with a similar problem of non-parallelism in the temporal and eternal missions/processions of the Spirit without great difficulty.) Hence I do not believe it is possible to preserve essential features in Christian faith without some gendered Trinitarian language: but the genders used may not need to be exclusively masculine. (I believe that for most Christians today, 'Father/Son' language alone will work at the *primary* level, though for some 'Mother/Daughter' language may do so. But I suspect that 'Father/Daughter' or 'Mother/Son' would not work, given the deep psychological problems in these relationships for many in our society.)

The beautiful motif of the *perichoresis* (mutual interpenetration) of the divine Persons embraces both 'masculine' and 'feminine' aspects of personal life: the infinite yet focussed Love within the Godhead, bursting out to create, save and bring to consummation. Father, Son and Spirit — or Mother, Son, Spirit etc. — preserve this beauty of love: Creator, Redeemer, Spirit seem to me to reduce it to technological functionalism.

On the other hand, there is much to be said on 'inclusivist' grounds for preserving gendered language in the doctrine. One reason male language for God is rejected is its association with ideas of domination. The doctrine or the Trinity is the very antithesis of 'controlling', power-dominated ideas. It is monism, or deism — 'plain oneness' views of God — which are linked with so-called 'masculine' power.¹² One God — one emperor — one empire is a convenient ideology for autocrats! That is possibly why the Arians held sway often in the imperial courts. Quite simply, only a Trinitarian God can be Love — without a creature being needed. Only the doctrine of the Trinity, with its vision of a 'God-in-relationship', can undermine the masculine-oriented, power-dominated view of God which so taints much Christian life. Bloesch completely misses this — and its corollary, that we who are made 'in the image of God' are to live in like relationship, as 'male and female' (Gen 1:26-28). But those who would eliminate all gendered imagery for God are also in danger of undermining this truth as well.

CONCLUSION

It is the harmonious relation of human beings, more alike than anything else in creation, yet different as even in every cell is female and male, which is the sign of God's own self-relationship. The Church is the place where, in Christ (the 'express image of God') such restored humanity is supposed to be seen and

demonstrated. Why should it not demonstrate this in more sensitive use of language about people, and richer language about God? Yet in doing so it is vital to the cause of 'non-exclusiveness' that Trinitarian language be complemented, not removed or replaced.

NOTES

1. See further A. Thiselton, *Language, Liturgy and Meaning* (Grove Liturgy Series 2, 1975).
2. The most practical piece I have come across is *Alive, Clear and Corporate*, produced by the Language and Liturgy Group of the Movement for the Ordination of Women (Melbourne, 1986). It is available from 2 McKenzie St. Brunswick, 3056, for \$1 per copy. Also good is V. Faull & J. Sinclair, *Count us In* (Grove Liturgy Series 46, 1986), and a useful Australian publication is the collection of essays edited by Bruce Wilson, *God, Sex and Language* (St. Mark's Canberra, 1987). Longer works containing guide-lines are S. & T. Neuffer Emswiler, *Women and Worship* (Harper & Row, 2nd ed 1984) and *Out of Darkness* (Melbourne: ACC, 1987).
3. D. Bloesch, *The Battle for the Trinity* (Servant, 1985) ch 2, 5.
4. So some contributors to *Out of Darkness*, although what this does for texts like 1 Cor 12:3 I am at a loss to say. A careful evaluation of 'patriarchy' is W. Visser't Hooft, *The Fatherhood of God in an Age of Emancipation* (WCC, 1985). A recent book which has helped me in a number of areas is Dianne Tennis, *Is God the Only Reliable Father?* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985): chapter 1 is on patriarchy. Both have further bibliography.
5. *Out of Darkness*, p 8. I am aware that this reflects possibly a 'process' perspective. A similar, but more 'orthodox' perspective is developed towards the end of this paper.
6. Bloesch, 32-33 (my emphasis).
7. For example, *Women and Worship*.
8. Bloesch, 47.
9. See further my 'On God and Gender', *Interchange* 21 (1977), and Tennis, chapter 5 (which updates the discussion).
10. So Tennis, 101-113.
11. *Women and Worship* suggests 'Maker, Christ, Holy Ghost' (why 'Ghost' is beyond me!), or even 'Yahweh, Jesus, Holy Fire'. The last is simply awful, and fails to realize that 'Father' and 'Yahweh' are NOT equivalent in trinitarian theology.
12. This perspective is powerfully developed in J. Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom* (SCM).

IMAGINATION AS A WAY OF HUMAN KNOWING*

Stan van Hoof

Liturgy is at once an expression of faith and a celebration of the content of that faith. This content is cognitive in the sense that it opens us to a reality beyond our mere subjectivity; a reality which elicits our worship and celebration. The challenge for liturgy is felt to be not just to give expression to our worship of this reality, but also to give form to our cognitive relation to it. To this end, it has been suggested that liturgy be understood and enhanced as an art form, since art is an imaginative human product which is both a means of human self expression and a way to truth. Imagination, in turn, is seen as central to art because it is the faculty through which the human subject transcends the given. Hence, it is the human faculty that can perform, at one time, both of the above tasks: that of giving expression to our worship and cognitive form to its object. As Patrick Collins puts it: 'God's truth is disclosed to us more fully through forms of imagination than through logic and concepts, words and notions.'¹ And again: 'What one comes to know through this cognitive functioning of imagination is the reality that is more than meets the eye.'² The purpose of this paper is to explore this cognitive role of the imagination. It will do this by reflecting in turn on three ways of thinking about human knowing: knowing as beholding, knowing as understanding, and knowing as belonging-in.

1

To describe the first conception of knowing we might use a technical philosophical term: namely, knowledge by acquaintance. The key idea here is that the object known is some sort of object which can be apprehended by the senses. In the case where the object is not of such a kind as can be directly apprehended in this way, some form of logical process must be able to lead on to a knowledge of it from data that is directly apprehensible. The sense that seems to have pre-eminence in this way of thinking of knowledge is that of sight. And the reason for this is not hard to fathom. In the case of sight we can most readily understand knowing as a form of relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. The subject is relatively passive and in receipt of information, while the object is a defined item in the world present to the subject in the form in which it is apprehended. Where the latter is not the case, it will be either because the subject deduces a non-sensory object from data provided by the senses, or because the subject has made a perceptual mistake. She might have failed to recognise correctly, whether through ignorance or misperception, the item presented to sight. This view of knowledge ties in with a simple view of reality that understands it to consist ultimately of just those items which are available to

our perception, and with a simple view of human subjectivity which takes it to consist of just a system for receiving and processing information.

It should not be thought, however, that this way of characterising knowledge is without philosophical depth. In the classical tradition, Plato allowed that the highest truths and realities could be known in this way. His notion of contemplation was a sophisticated version of knowledge understood through the metaphor of sight. Plato's Forms were transcendent entities available to the eyes of the soul properly prepared by reason and asceticism. For the classical thinkers the excellence and perfection of human subjectivity was defined in terms of the excellence and perfection of those entities with which such subjectivity could be in cognitive contact. It is well known, however, that Plato was deeply suspicious of imagination. Whatever his precise understanding of those mental faculties which accounted for creativity and artistic production, whether they were a form of inspiration by the gods, or a form of possession by internal daimons or dream forces, his view was that they resulted in a distortion of reality. Only a pure receptivity understood as a higher form of sight acting by the pure light of reason could guarantee the truth of the vision of the Forms.

As for the notion of imagination that flows from the more modern conception of knowledge by acquaintance, it was a consequence of the centrality of passivity in this conception that the imagination would be dependent upon the information of which the human information processing system of subjectivity would be in receipt. So we have the conception of the imagination as a reprocessing of memory elements. Only by varying remembered inputs could the imagination produce anything new. For example, the imagining of a unicorn consists of placing together the remembered image of a horse with the remembered image of a single straight horn. No elements that were not initially elements of sensory experience can be conceived of as entering into the imagination. This view of the imagination is more dependent even than its parent cognitive theories on the idea of internal sense data or mental images. It is the manipulation of these internal subjective entities which constitutes the exercise of the imagination. But, of course, insofar as these elements are internal and subjective, the cognitive status of imagination is immediately called into question. If truth and knowledge consist in contact with external and objective reality, then mental images as products of memory or imagination could have only a very weak claim to epistemological credibility. It is the consequent correlation of imagination with make-believe and fantasy that has robbed it of its claim to be a disclosure of truth insofar as imagination's images are constructed by the mind rather than received through the senses, they are unreal and non-cognitive.

Other writers in the empiricist tradition suggest that it is a function of the imagination to 'colour' our experience of the world by adding affective

associations to it, or by structuring it in accordance with our psychological predispositions.³ In this way we gain a lived meaningful environment which is a sum of reality as it is in itself and of the meanings we attribute to it by virtue of our imaginations. Imagination is here understood as a case of 'seeing as'. So we might say that it is an achievement of imagination to see someone as sad.⁴ The cognitive value of this is still in question, however. Does it take imagination to see the person as sad because, in fact, he is not sad? Or because he does not look sad while he is? If either is right, then the only truth to which this view of imagination allows access is that of subjectivity itself. Insofar as meanings are constituted by the subject, they are a form of self-expression projected into the world. The knowledge which they give, therefore, is knowledge only of the subject. Ultimately, empiricism can claim to give us knowledge only of the world which is sensorily and logically available to us, and of our own affective reactions to it.

But there may be a way out of this impasse. If the imagination is the faculty whereby images drawn from memory (or even from perception) are combined and recombined, then how are we to explain the possibility of saying that this faculty can be exercised imaginatively or otherwise? This question requires us to distinguish the imagination as a faculty from the notion of imaginativeness as a skill or talent displayed in the exercise of this or any other faculty.⁵ One may imagine a unicorn in the standard way and form an image of a standard unicorn in doing so, or one can be imaginative and form the image of a truly original unicorn with features that no other unicorn has had. Let us allow that the explanation for how either is possible is still given in terms of the combination of sensory elements. If the faculty of imagination is understood as the ability to combine elements ultimately derived from experience in ways which do not accord with reality, then the person who imagines a routine unicorn has exercised that faculty just as much as the person whose imaginary unicorn is marked by flair and originality. In what do the latter qualities consist then? To attribute them to imaginativeness is to go round in a circle unless we can identify a difference between the two cases.

A preliminary point to make is that insofar as we are concerned with art, we should not confine ourselves to the mental products of imaginers. We should look at the actual works produced by persons. (We need not, in any case, limit our discussion by accepting the view that mental images are central. It may be possible to imagine what a unicorn looks like without having any mental images. In response to being asked so to imagine, I might say that it is white, has a long golden horn, and so forth, and yet at no point form an image of it.) Let us suppose that our two subjects are asked to draw a unicorn and let us suppose that their technical skills at drawing are similar. The imaginative person will draw a unicorn that will interest us because of its originality. Is this because she has first imagined that unicorn in her mind? It could be, but it is just as possible (and more

likely) that she came to this original conception as she drew. She might have imagined how it would look with its horn short and stubby but this will have consisted in thinking about how it would look on the page rather than forming a mental image of a unicorn in the mind as a model to be copied.⁶ There are many artists and commentators on the creative process⁷ who deny that a painter first forms a mental image of what is to be drawn and then copies it. Rather, they form the image with their pencils. Imaginativeness or creativity has a thought component, of course, but it will consist in trying out one line or another as one proceeds. One might do this in fact and rub out the line if it proves unsatisfactory, or one may imagine what such a line will look like at that point and then decide to draw it or not. But this is far removed from having a mental image of the whole picture. The person who draws the interesting picture is the one who can draw imaginatively or creatively. The only mental faculty required for imaginativeness in this sense is an ability to think about or anticipate the outcomes of what one does.

It follows that imaginativeness is linked inextricably to action in the real world. It is not something that derives from a special mental faculty to be called imagination and to be accounted for in terms of the ability to combine mental images derived from experience into new conglomerations. Action in the world quite standardly involves various forms of envisaging what one intends. This might take the simple form of an implicit horizon of objectives for routine behaviour brought to light only when things turn out to be different from what was expected. Or it might take the form of a fully elaborated Utopian vision which operates in one's life as an ideal to be realized as fully as possible. In none of these cases is mental imagery essential. Imaginativeness is primarily a quality of action. It should be thought of as a quality of thought only insofar as the latter is a form of action. One displays imagination by thinking creatively rather than just by exercising the faculty of imagination. And one can think creatively with or without mental images. The faculty of unreal image making is just one of the faculties that can be exercised imaginatively.

These points may offer an escape from the empiricists' impasse in that they lead to a suggestion that cognitive value attaches to anything marked by the quality of originality. Is not the imaginatively imagined unicorn of greater worth than the routinely imagined one? And is not this worth of some cognitive significance? Perhaps something new can be discovered in this unicorn which could not have been discovered in the routine imaginary unicorns. Phenomenologically, we can support this suggestion by alluding to the experience of interest elicited by an original production as opposed to a routine one. There is a moment of surprise and captivation when we apprehend something original. We might call it an *attunement*. Whereas routine things fit into our expectations and received structures of knowledge, original things seem to open up new possibilities and to

expand our knowledge. It is preeminently in such disciplines as logic and mathematics that the cognitive value of which I am speaking can be illustrated. The imaginative solution to a mathematical problem will be a cognitively valuable solution as the result of the special quality of the thought which went into it. Now, this cognitive value cannot arise just from the fact that experiential elements have been recombined. It arises from the fact that they have been recombined with flair and originality. It is the imaginativeness of the creative process that has opened a cognitive dimension.

If we return now to our original question of how the imagination can take us beyond the given, we see that we cannot accept the answer that says that it does so by recombining elements of the given in new ways. We want to know the nature and origin of this newness. We have located it in the imaginativeness of thought. For empiricism this will mean that we have located it in the subject of experience. But then we will have departed from the conception of a separate and largely passive cognitive subject in relation to an objective reality which is central to this tradition of thought. If we want to maintain empiricism's basic metaphysical orientation we would need to argue that the origin of the creativity evinced by the subject when it is imaginative cannot have anything to do with objective reality. It must be expressive, therefore, of something purely subjective. Although we have glimpsed some cognitive value arising here, it seems that we have not yet fully escaped our earlier impasse.

2

Our second conception of human knowing is centred on the notion of explanation. It is when we can explain a phenomenon that we feel we have knowledge of it. Even if the best we can do is to classify it rather than account for its origins, we will still have brought it under our schemata of understanding. Our scientific theories and systems of classification are created in response to our need to order and control our objective reality and bend it to our technological wills. The notions of reality which accord with this mode of knowing are twofold. Firstly, reality may be understood as that which resists our will and needs to be mastered by it. Insofar as this notion of reality lies essentially beyond the grasp of understanding as it has developed to that point, an element of mystery must attend it. For the scientific spirit of our age, however, such mystery is unacceptable. Hence, a second notion of reality emerges in which it becomes equated with the constructs of theoretical reason. Those entities posited to exist by our scientific theories are what make up this reality. Lest it be thought that this reality is then fictional, truth is analysed in terms of the coherence and practical success of the theories which establish this reality.

Along with this technocratic form of knowing there is a technocratic form of imagination. It is that imagination displayed by the successful solver of problems

or creator of theories. The ability to think of a new explanatory hypothesis or of a new productive technique, the ability to think 'laterally', or to envisage new possibilities is what is praised as imaginativeness in this mode of knowing. The processes that give rise to such imaginativeness are frankly accepted as mysterious. They may be dream forces, subconscious associations, or random intuitions. Techniques of jolting thought out of routine patterns, or even just of 'sleeping on a problem' are the stock in trade of the purveyors of creativity and imagination in this frame of thought.

Once again, this tradition of thought is not without its moments of depth. Kant spent most of his considerable intellectual energy seeking to explain how the human mind could create theories and forms of knowing which would apprehend reality with epistemological assurance. But he was aware too that reality as it was in itself was forever beyond the grasp of our cognitive efforts. Such noumenal realities as 'the thing in itself', our freedom, the moral law, and God could not be known by those processes through which we bent reality to our service. The apprehension of these truths was left to cognitive processes of a quite different order from those which founded the possibility of science and technology. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant gives the faculty of imagination a role which elevates it above the mere gatherer and organiser of the inputs of sense which was the role it played in the first critique. Whereas the interest in that first great work was in the ways in which the understanding imposed categories and forms of cognition on this raw material provided by the imagination, the third critique describes the ways in which the faculties of imagination and understanding interact in a free play which is non-purposive but productive. It is in the making of aesthetic judgement that such interaction takes place. What such judgement is productive of is an elevated form of pleasure gained through a freeing of the cognitive faculties from the constraints of pragmatism. By allowing imagination and understanding a pure mutual interaction, the subject can apprehend nature *as if* it were purposive and so discover beauty. But as well, the subject can discover meaning. Aesthetic judgement can elevate us into a realm of universality which allows for glimpses of the noumenal.

It is these glimpses of the noumenal that give imagination as it plays its part in aesthetic experience a cognitive role of a new kind. A work of art is marked by genius not just when it displays the creativity or high craft skills of the artist, but when it presents an 'aesthetic idea' in apprehensible form. Aesthetic ideas are those notions which our empirical and pragmatic cognitive forms cannot grasp. Kant's own examples include eternity, creation, death, and love.⁸ If no experientially based forms of knowing can grasp these notions fully, then a form is needed in which they can be imaginatively grasped. Whereas the attempt to understand such things would consist in the impossible attempt to bring these matters under a definite concept of the understanding, it is the talent of artistic

genius to provide forms through which these ideas can be invoked in all their significance without being captured in a limiting form. More concretely, it is metaphor and analogy, whether in the forms of literature, imagery, or action, which provide the interplay of imagination and understanding with the open-ended cognitive dimension through which aesthetics can transcend the sensory and enter the domain of ideas. Beyond the pragmatic use of our cognitive powers, aesthetic experience allows those powers to uncover the meaning that reality can have for us and the mystery that lies beyond that meaning. Beyond technocratic cognition, there is aesthetic cognition as sensitivity to the meaningful dimension of lived reality and to the noumenal mystery that lies beyond it.

A further point that Kant stresses is that the exercise of genius necessarily involves the creation of something original. It is because an aesthetic idea has been grasped through a new metaphor that it is brought back to cognitive life. It is not just that the shock of the new draws our attention to a work and establishes, as we noted earlier, a sort of attunement with it, it is also that the new replaces the jaded old. Those notions, images, and productions which had been living metaphors of the ineffable will have inevitably faded. It is the role of artistic genius to provide the ever new articulations which allow the expanded and elevated cognitive role of the imagination which we have described. The pristine moment of aesthetic judgement is one of primordial attunement which precedes and pre-empts any reflexive or conceptual grasp. Whereas knowledge is standardly an application of an established conceptual and linguistic framework and is thereby confined to the hermeneutic circle of what is already more or less familiar and understood, the quality of genius or imaginativeness as it attaches to a work of art affords a new opening upon the noumenal. As such, the cognitive value of the imagination is tied to the latter's originality. This value is made possible by the freedom of genius to 'give the rule to nature' as opposed to the conceptual constraints that apply to pragmatic knowledge. An individual, spontaneous, and intuitive dimension of subjectivity is here given its place in the sun as opposed to the general, analytic, and logical. That genius is free in this way does not mean that it is not motivated. The driving force of the play of genius is dissatisfaction with the present. It is that which is not present which moves the seeker of aesthetic meaning. Not only is the artist moved by that exercise of taste which leads him to say that what he has thus far produced is not yet what he seeks, he is also moved by the desire to articulate the ineffable.

Insofar as the role of imagination and creativity was seen by Kant as that of providing expression to what cannot be clearly cognitively grasped, his view has been appropriated by many to substantiate various forms of cognitive and symbol theories in art. There are those who say that thinking with symbols is a means needed by those primitives who cannot manage the abstract and conceptual forms of knowledge with which we are familiar and who must

therefore confine themselves to the concrete. Ritual and myth would then be seen to be stages of cultural evolution which must be, and perhaps have been, overcome by our own scientific modernity. On this view imagination has cognitive value only for primitives. Again, it has been held that imagination can give us knowledge when description fails us. So it might be possible to know what something smells like⁹ even though one does not have the words to describe the smell. One might imagine it and in that way be acquainted with it. Of course there is nothing mysterious here. Our vocabulary is just not rich with words for describing smells. Smells do not have distinguishable features that readily admit of description. But a smell is not a metaphysical 'absence' which lies beyond our cognitive grasp. To deal with such grander notions there are those like Jaspers¹⁰ who speak of the need for 'ciphers' to express the longings of our souls or to embody the objects of such longing. There is much that is suggestive in such views. But it must be remembered that even what is symbolically said in this way freezes immediately and leads to a new reification. It is the originality of an utterance or action that allows it to say the ineffable. It is not representation (mimesis) that matters, but creation (poesis).

Further, we should be wary of a particularly subjectivist form of this view of the imagination which has had wide currency in recent times.¹¹ Susan Langer describes art as a 'symbol of feeling'.¹² She relies on the truism that feelings and emotions are both turbulent and inchoate. One can be aware of a dynamic flow of internal affective experience and of the poverty of our languages and other expressive means for bringing this flow to articulation. Langer's view of art is that it provides the symbolic form through which such articulation is possible. The pattern of feelingful life can be presented and expressed by way of a parallel or analogy between it and the flow of energy elements in, for example, music. It follows, of course, that subjective feeling can then be cognitively grasped (and perhaps even understood). The value of art is seen to be not only that it can bring our subjectivity to expression, but also that it allows us an awareness of our feelings that we would otherwise not have.

One does not need to have a religious perspective to see deep hubris in this view. That the measure of the value of art should be given in terms of the self-awareness it affords to human subjectivity is an offence against humanism as well as any transcendentalist view. The notion that human feelings should be of such interest as to be the proper content of the highest achievements of our culture is offensive to the aspirations of most creative spirits in human history. If art and imagination are to be revelatory, they should be revelatory of something more important than mere human feelings. Kant saw this clearly when he took art to be a symbol of morality. For him the glimpses afforded by works of genius were symbolic of that noumenal sphere in which such transcendently important realities as the moral law and the God for whom it existed had their being.

Perhaps the more active role which Kant afforded to subjectivity, combined with the powerful achievements of the technocratic knowledge which that subjectivity was said to found could only lead to that hubris of which he himself knew nothing.

3

Our third mode of human knowing, that of belonging-in, challenges the very subject-object dichotomy which the first two presuppose. The first concept of knowing saw the subject as predominantly passive in relation to an objective reality so that the exercise of imagination could only be either a creation of unreality out of elements drawn from reality, or a fanciful expression of subjectivity. The second notion of knowledge allowed for a cognitive role to be played by both the faculty of imagination and by an imaginative exercise of all the faculties of subjectivity through the originality of genius. Both views reified subjectivity and objectivity as essentially separate orders of being such that it was the task of cognition to bring them together. But what if this distinction is a metaphysical construction imposed upon, but not necessitated by, our pre-reflexive experience? After all, if Being is totality, then we are, as subjects, a part of Being, rather than its detached observers. To what notions of knowledge and imagination would a realisation of this lead? Knowledge would become acknowledgement. It would become acknowledgement of the fact that our being is inextricably bound up with reality and that our objectifying structures of thought arise out of a mode of existence primordially at one with the rest of beings. We are not only in the world, we are of it. Whereas the Kantian tradition attributed the difficulty of speaking about the ineffable to the metaphysical unknowability of the objects of such talk, we would now have a new account of this difficulty. It is the fact that our language divides reality into subject and object which makes it difficult to articulate the unity of Being.

The fundamental point about Being is that it *is*. This might seem obvious enough but we need to appreciate that that latter word is a verb. Were it not a metaphysical way of speaking, we could say that Being acts: that its being is an act. It follows that any action or dynamism amongst the beings that make up reality is a privileged instance of Being. Any being is an instance of Being, of course, but where something happens, Being comes into its own, as it were. Now, along with all our actions, our thought and speech are occurrences within the world. They are events or occurrences. They are instances of our being, where the latter word is understood as a verb. Further, action, thought, and speech are not like a rock falling in a wilderness. The latter is an event with causal antecedents and consequences, of course, but nothing is disclosed by that wilderness event, nothing comes to light in it. A thought, on the other hand, along with any language event, can be a disclosure of reality into unhiddenness. Whereas the

wilderness event remains hidden in that it remains meaningless (it does not matter whether or not the event is observed; it would still be meaningless to a normal observer), a thought or speech act is meaningful. It conveys something. As such it is a happening of Being which is also a self-disclosure of Being.

Of course an utterance may just convey information in the sense of making a difference to some worldly event. I may be at an auction and may speak in the making of a bid. This speech act will be an event that makes a difference to what happens and in that sense it will be informational in the sense explained by information theorists. But these words will merely be elements in a process. They will be causal tokens with antecedents and consequences just like the rock in the desert. That the words I uttered have a specifiable meaning is what makes them informationally effective in that context. From an objectivist orientation, the event is just a bid in an auction, lost, like the stone in the wilderness, in the self-closure of observed reality. One will need an understanding of relevant historical institutions to describe it correctly, but one would still be applying concepts to a sensorily given reality. But what further meaning can those words have? Suppose I was prepared to bid so much because I thought the work that was being auctioned of great artistic merit. Suppose further that I do not have great wealth but am drawn by a deep aesthetic fascination for that work to bid a large sum in making the bid I will now be taking a stance. I will be expressing a significance that the work has for me. The utterance is now more than a causal link in an institutional process. It is, for me, a taking of a risk, an act of love, and perhaps, a slight defilement of that love in the mire of consumerism. From a subjectivist orientation, the meaningfulness of the utterance is seen in terms of its being a self-disclosure: an expression of my authentic being.

Is there a third alternative to these objectivist and subjectivist understandings? There would not be if I saw the impetus which led to my bidding for the work as originating in me as an existentialist thinker might. On this view the bid is a choice of which I, as freedom, am the radical author. Even if we allow for psychologically understood motivations and thereby departed from existentialist orthodoxy, we would then only face once again the options of an objectivist causal account of my act in terms of its psychologically hypostatized causes, or a subjectivist account in terms of my phenomenologically discovered desires and wants. But in any of these descriptions I am depending on concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, concepts which are basic to metaphysics. How could I recover a pre-reflexive awareness of what happens? Would I not need to think of the origin of that impetus as other than my objectified or phenomenologically structured self? Would I not need to think of myself as responding to an impetus rather than initiating it? Even the notion of impetus misleads. To what would I be responding? To the work surely. It is the work that I love and that is leading me to stake my meagre savings so as to acquire it. But to what in the work am I

responding? What elicits my love of it? If we had a specific work before us we could answer this question with the normal conceptual equipment of art criticism. We might say that the colours were vibrant, the forms powerful. (I am assuming we would not say that the figure reminded me of my mother since that would be a personal evocation which does not admit of the exemplary universality that Kant insisted was central to an aesthetic experience.) But what would be the fundamental meaning of any such account of the aesthetic properties of the work? It would be precisely that the work had power over its viewer that it spoke to its audience that it elicited a love in its audience. If this is right then above all else, this work will be an occurrence: a dynamic event.

A pre-theoretical and pre-reflexive awareness would discover that the impetus was in the work. This is more than just the claim that the aesthetic power of a work is such as to take us out of ourselves so that we lose our sense of separate identity. It is true that we may be so fascinated by a work, so absorbed in it, that the boundaries between ourselves and it seem to dissolve. But this phenomenon occurs whenever a subject is absorbed in an engrossing activity or experience. This could still be understood as essentially a form of relationship, albeit a close one, between metaphysically distinct entities. What we are seeking to articulate is the notion that the work-of-art-as-experienced constitutes a unity in which objectivity and subjectivity merge. That which I love forms, with me, a new dynamic being of the work into which I merge. The primordial nature of this work-being is to be a unity in which something happens.

What is it that happens in the work? We can now make explicit the Heideggerian theme towards which we have been moving. What happens in the work is that Being reveals itself as meaning. The work sets up a world: a meaningful context of lived and understood experience which the work embodies and to which it contributes. It hides the reality of its material basis as canvas-and-applied-paint under its aesthetic impact and meaningful relation to the human lived world. Yet, it is as canvas-and-applied-paint that it can do this. Its authentic being as part of a humanly meaningful world is inextricable from its being present to hand as part of this hidden and objectifiable reality. This materiality is both brought to openness through the meaning of the work and remains hidden behind it insofar as it is the meaning of the work to which we are led to attend. The aesthetic power of the work arises from this dual event of hiding and opening: from the tension between them. Ordinary pragmatic things are simply transparent. We see through them to the usefulness they have for us. A hammer is simply to be used and says nothing to us just about itself. Even a painting, a cityscape say, can be used as an illustration in a history lesson, or it can be appreciated as a work of art. In the former case it will be 'transparent' and lead thought to the times it illustrates, while in the latter case it will lead thought both to this world which it has set up and to its materiality and createdness.¹³

And what is this aesthetic power of hiding and opening? An objectivist would either be led by the historical effects of this power (namely, the institutions of the art world) into calling it a cause, or be confined to a formalist explanation underwritten by gestalt psychological theories. A subjectivist would equate it with, or attribute it to, creativity, imaginativeness, or genius. This last does bring us to the threshold of what we seek. Subjectivity was seen by Kant, and was seen, at least initially, by Heidegger, as a uniquely privileged place in which Being comes to disclosure. Heidegger would not speak of subjectivity as such, of course, since this would return him to the metaphysics he seeks to overcome, but rather of the self-disclosure of Being. What allows this disclosure? Heidegger's answers to this question range from the authenticity of *Dasein* as care, through the originality of the artist, to the preserving attention of thought.

Dasein is the term used by Heidegger in *Being and Time*¹⁴ for human reality, for that being for whom being is a matter of concern. He uses it to stress the relatedness of that being to its world. This relatedness is both a threat and a destiny. It is a threat in that *Dasein* can lose itself in the commonality of ordinary everyday reality and thereby escape the authenticating anxiety which would come to it if it faced its destiny as an *existing* being; as a being which has to make itself concerned for its own being. Inauthentic being has an enviroing world of metaphysically objectified reality, whereas authentic being has an enviroing world of pre-reflexive projects and entities with which it is concerned. It is in this latter relational world that Being comes more authentically to expression. It does so not in the metaphysically structured sense of being one of a set of items, but in the dynamic event of *care*. Precisely because *Dasein* belongs to this worldly realm and will return to it in death, must it struggle to preserve its being in time. This is more than a happening of the truth of the being of *Dasein*. This is happening of truth of Being. Dynamism in time is the essence of Being. By way of the authentic being of *Dasein*, Being is disclosed as what is.

In his essay 'On the Origin of the Work of Art',¹⁵ Heidegger locates the disclosure of Being in the originality of *poiesis*. Just as authenticity arises from the transcending of the everyday, so originality arises from the transcending of routine as routine. It is pre-eminently in art that the occasion for such originality arises. I meet this challenge when I see the *Mona Lisa* as if for the first time or when I hear Mozart as if for the first time. At such moments the power of the aesthetic will be manifest as the strife between openness and hiddenness or the struggle of new meaning emerging through the routine of habitual readings. It will be the recognition of the createdness of the work, of its standing out from the routine entities of the everyday, the createdness of which is hidden or forgotten. It would be to fall back into subjectivism to say that I create that originality either as genius artist or as attentive audience. I belong to the process through which this originality does its work but it is not the case that I *am* it. It does its work

through me. It would be to continue such a subjectivism to suggest that it is my faculty of imagination which is in focus in this discussion. Once again, that would be just to name in an objectifying terminology an aspect of the auto-disclosive happening of Being. Originality is not the property of a subject, or of an art object. It is the quality of an occurrence. It is the quality of opening and truthfulness which that occurrence has despite all its tendencies to closure, such as materiality and familiarity. The origin of this quality is Being seeking to disclose itself.

If Being discloses itself as the truth of art, what would constitute truth? Clearly, it would not be correspondence between reality understood as object, and statements understood as propositions posited by a subject. Such a relationship presupposes the dualist metaphysics in which there is no place for Being as the One. Rather, truth is that disclosure which is secured by the creativity which cares for and preserves the tension between hiding and opening. But what, then, is untruth? The answer should now be clear. It would be the hiddenness occasioned by routine, familiarity, and objectification. It would be the triumph of enclosure over disclosure. Such a triumph would be secured by inattentiveness, inauthenticity, and the unwillingness to think. In Heidegger's later essays¹⁶ this disclosive vocation of a thinking which is a meditative openness to Being is most fully articulated. The preserving of the work-being of a work of art is here more fully elaborated as a destined and respectful concern with all of reality as a disclosure of Being.

What now is left of our question concerning the cognitive role of the imagination? We have moved from speaking of the imagination to speaking of imaginativeness. This led us to creativity and genius as a talent displayed by an artist to afford us the shock of the 'new'. From there we moved to originality as that quality of a work through which an ineffable reality discloses itself. And from this metaphysically distant reality we moved to Being as the All of which we are parts. Art is a privileged instance of Being disclosing itself as truth. Because Being requires those beings that are concerned with Being to be its speakers, our destiny is to both be and preserve the originary in art. This is the cognitive task for imagination.

4

Nothing of philosophical value would be achieved by speaking of Being as God. The revelation of God, His incarnation in Christ and in sacraments are matters for theological elucidation. This essay cannot enter that domain. What it can do is to articulate how thought in its imaginative and originative mode can be a knowledge of Being. The question that remains is whether liturgy, of which ceremonial repetition seems to be an inherent aspect, can admit of the originality which would make it an authentic disclosure of Being. Perhaps one fruitful way

to reflect on this problem would be to return to Heidegger's initial formulations in terms of the notion of authenticity. The honesty and courage of the seeking with which worship is approached, the submission and devotion which one brings to it, may be avenues through which Being discloses itself. The task of liturgy would then be that of creating the opportunity for such states of pre-reflexive religious authenticity. But liturgy also needs to be a phenomenon itself marked by disclosive originality in the sense we have described. Each ceremony must be made anew so that it can be experienced as a primordial disclosure of the One. This will be like the task of creating art, but also different from it. I must leave to this conference the task of exploring its exact nature.

FOOTNOTES

- * Thanks are owed to Terry Godfrey, a colleague at Victoria College, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Patrick W. Collins, *More Than Meets the Eye: Ritual and Parish Liturgy* (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 12.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 3. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
 4. Roger Scruton, *Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind* (London: Methuen & Co., 1974), p. 107. Scruton's cases are a little different from mine and involve two different examples. (a) We could see that x is sad where this is a form of judgement based on what we do see, or (b), we could see the sadness in x's face, which is a standard form of seeing. To see x as sad is a feat of imagination because it involves a way of seeing, or of 'colouring' what we see.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
 6. Roger Taylor, *Beyond Art: What Art is and Might Become if Freed from Cultural Elitism* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1981), p. 30.
 7. One notable example is Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his 'Eye and Mind', reprinted in Harold Osborne (ed.), *Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
 8. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, part one, section 49.
 9. Scruton, *op.cit.*, p. 106.
 10. A good introductory text, and one that is of theological relevance, is: Karl Jaspers and Rudolph Bultmann, *Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion without Myth* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1958). Included amongst the many writers who follow this tradition must be: David N. Power, O.M.I., *Unsearchable Riches: The Symbolic Nature of Liturgy* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1984).
 11. Collins, *op.cit.*, is just one of many writers who draw on this view.
 12. Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).
 13. Paul Ricoeur, in his 'The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection' (reprinted in Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart (eds.), *Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 38, argues that symbols are partially 'opaque' in the sense described in that their symbolic meaning depends on, and is embodied by, their normal meaning. In that way, the normal meaning is both hidden and disclosed in the metaphor.
 14. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973). A good text for showing the relevance of Heidegger to theological matters is: James L. Perotti, *Heidegger on the Divine: The Thinker, the Poet and God* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974).

15. Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, translated and edited by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
16. For example, Martin Heidegger, 'Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking', tr. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, in *Discourse on Thinking* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

MAUNDY THURSDAY AND THE PASSOVER

Gregory C. Jenks

The view that the Last Supper was a Passover meal is a very old one within Christian tradition. Its earliest exponent seems to have been Mark, whose account of the Last Supper clearly identifies it as a paschal meal. However, there are grounds for disputing this paschal character attributed to the Last Supper by Mark. These grounds begin with literary considerations relating to Mark's material in ch 14, and include the opposing witness of other valuable NT sources (such as John's Gospel and I Corinthians) and evidence drawn from studies of chronology and the ancient calendar. The issue has been thoroughly canvassed in specialist studies in numerous essays, articles and monographs.¹

In this brief discussion, the main points at issue in the debate over the paschal character of the Last Supper will be reviewed and the significance of the question for the Maundy Thursday liturgy, in particular, will be considered. This is a different focus from most other studies which have been more concerned with historical or theological matters. This paper reviews the debate and draws a negative conclusion on the alleged paschal character of the Last Supper, but then proceeds to consider the implications of such a view for the celebration of Christ's death in the liturgies of Maundy Thursday and Good Friday.

I

It is clear from the NT that the earliest Christians often thought of Jesus' death in paschal terms. There is an extensive body of NT evidence which relates his death to the Passover. That material falls into two clearly distinct categories. There is a group of writings which establish the paschal connection by identifying the Last Supper as an actual Passover meal, and there is another tradition, represented more broadly in the NT, which connects the death of Jesus to the Passover by understanding him as the paschal lamb.

The most important NT passage for the view that the Last Supper was a Passover meal is to be found in Mark 14. The general time of year involved is established in vss 1-2, and then vss 12-16 recount the story of the preparations which were undertaken so that Jesus could observe the Passover meal with his disciples. While it is possible to take these verses at face value, and still recognise that they do not prove that the actual Last Supper was the intended Passover meal, the better interpretation seems to be that Mark was intending to portray the meal described in vss 17ff as the Passover. It seemed most probable, however, that vss 12-16 are a literary creation of Mark as they have many characteristic signs of Markan authorship and the parallel passages in Matthew and Luke seem to be secondary to that in Mark.²

Matthew follows Mark's characterisation of the Last Supper as a Passover meal but adds nothing new. Matt 26:17-19 seem to be an abbreviation of Mark 14:12-16. Luke, on the other hand, adds two new elements to the tradition found in Mark. While repeating the general reference to Passover time in 22:1 and using the Markan preparation story in 22:8-13, Luke adds two significant statements in vss 7 and 15. At 22:7, the day of the meal is identified with the day when the Passover lambs were slaughtered, i.e., Nisan 15. The preparation for the meal is thereby deliberately set in the context of the Passover and connected with the preparation of the paschal lamb. In 22:15 Luke puts onto the lips of Jesus the statement that he had greatly desired to eat "this Passover" with the disciples before he himself suffered. With these two additions, Luke clearly opts for the view that the Last Supper itself was a Passover meal. Once again, however, there are compelling grounds for understanding Luke's account as secondary and derivative, and to deprive vss 7 and 15 of any historical weight in a serious discussion of the paschal character of the Last Supper.³

Over against the synoptic portrayal of the Last Supper as a Passover meal, there is the more general NT witness to the view that Jesus was a paschal lamb, or that his death was to be interpreted by the model of the paschal lamb. This interpretation seems to be attested from John, I Corinthians, I Peter and Revelation. The fourth gospel, in particular, has numerous references which exclude a date for the Last Supper on Nisan 15 and instead suggest an understanding that Jesus died on Nisan 15 as the paschal lamb.⁴ Similarly, the references to "Christ our paschal lamb" in I Cor 5:7, to the saving efficacy of the "the precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without blemish or spot" in I Peter 1:19, and to Jesus as the slain lamb whose blood ransoms people for God in Rev 5:6ff, all point to a widely-disseminated and differing view of the paschal significance of Maundy Thursday and Good Friday.

Despite the double nature of the NT paschal imagery, many scholars have sought to establish that the Last Supper itself was a Passover meal. The most important modern writer in this regard has been Joachim Jeremias, whose work *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* was first translated into English in 1955 and has had a significant influence on opinions in the English-speaking world ever since. Jeremias can be conveniently taken as the best summary of the arguments for the paschal character of the Last Supper as there has been little but repetition and resume in the discussions published since his work was revised and reissued in the 1960s. Jeremias presents fourteen "considerations" that he believes establish beyond reasonable doubt the paschal character of the Last Supper. These cannot be discussed in detail in this paper, but may be listed briefly here, with a brief evaluation of them in the next section.

1. Jerusalem as the location of the meal;
2. the ease with which a room was obtained;

3. the evening time of the meal;
4. the small number present;
5. the posture adopted during the meal;
6. a supposed state of levitical purity in John 13:10;
7. the timing of the action with the bread;
8. the use of wine;
9. supposed use of red wine;
10. the dismissal of Judas;
11. idea of alms being given to the poor during the meal;
12. a hymn sung at the end;
13. staying within the sacred precincts after the meal;
14. actual words of interpretation and institution.

On the basis of these arguments, which he defends at some length in his book,⁵ Jeremias concludes that the Last Supper was a Passover meal. He then goes on to draw certain theological implications from that conclusion in the continuing discussion within his book. It is not my intention to pursue his more general thought, as I wish now to turn to a brief consideration of the case against Jeremias' views and then I hope to draw some liturgical implications of my own with relevance to the celebration of Christ's passion on Maundy Thursday evening and Good Friday.

II

As has been intimated already, despite the confidence with which Jeremias presents the case for the Last Supper having been a Passover meal, there are also significant and, I propose, convincing grounds to reconsider the general consensus over the paschal character of the Last Supper. These are not to be found in any single published work, as the critics of Jeremias' work have usually contented themselves with questioning one or other of his points in arguments in learned articles. It is a measure of his magisterial learning that no-one has brought out a major work seeking to cover all the aspects of Jewish and New Testament studies which are involved in these matters.

The discussion which follows will draw on and summarise the criticisms made of Jeremias' views by numerous scholars. It will demonstrate that the paschal character of the Last Supper is at best an open question, and may in fact need to be decided in the negative. This critique draws on my earlier research on the topic as well as further considerations which have come to mind since that work was undertaken.

There are eleven objections to Jeremias' presentation which he acknowledges and addresses himself in his study.⁶ These need to be listed and considered briefly since, despite his attempts to neutralise them, some still weigh against his views.

The eleven objections are as follows:—

1. The NT uses *artos*, the word for ordinary bread, and not *azyma*, the word for unleavened bread. [Jeremias replies that *artos* could be used for unleavened bread, but he does not address the issue of why one of the most distinctive features of “the first day of unleavened bread” should be obscured in this manner.]
2. Some have pointed to a tension between the custom of frequent celebration of the Supper of the Lord in the early church and the annual nature of the Passover. [Jeremias correctly notes that the Lord’s Supper is not a memorial or repetition of the Last Supper, but of the cross and resurrection. He seems right to dismiss this objection.]
3. Many elements of a Passover meal are absent from the Last Supper narratives. [Jeremias argues that the interest was only in those elements relevant to the later eucharistic tradition. He attempts to sidestep the real force of this objection, whose essence lies precisely in the fact that so little of the alleged paschal character of the Last Supper has survived in the NT traditions that one can reasonably ask whether the minimal signs of paschal elements are not themselves later additions by people who assumed that the meal was a Passover because it happened more or less “at Passover time”.]
4. The force of the previous objection is reinforced, despite Jeremias’ objections, by the fact that even with the few paschal elements which have come down in the Last Supper traditions there are conflicts between those narratives and the established liturgical practices of the Pesach: the order of events differs; a single cup is used in common instead of each drinking from his own cup; individual bowls are used, etc. [Jeremias seeks to establish that the earlier paschal traditions were more flexible than later texts indicate, and that the contrasts are overstated.]
5. The desire of the Jewish hierarchy to dispose of Jesus “before the festival” (Mark 14:1-2) seems to contradict the synoptic chronology as it would require the arrest and trial to precede the Passover, and thus put the Supper back to the previous night as in John. [Jeremias translates the phrase “in front of the festival crowd” in an attempt to sidestep this objection. This point will be noted again below.]
6. The Passover amnesty provisions in Pesachim 8:6 suggest that a person was to be released prior to the festival so that he could enjoy the festival. [Jeremias challenges the implicit assumption that Roman authorities would have followed the timing of the Jewish customs, but he does not demonstrate that this point is misdirected.]
7. Paul’s description of Christ as “our Passover lamb” in I Cor 5:7 relates the death of Jesus to the paschal imagery, not the meal. [Jeremias asserts that the Last Supper, understood as a Passover, was the source of the paschal

imagery and that this imagery only moved into paschal lamb terminology as a secondary development.]

8. The description of Jesus as the “first-fruits of them that sleep” in I Cor 15:20 has been seen as an echo of his resurrection’s occurring on the first day of the festival of first-fruits, Nisan 16, a date requiring the Last Supper to be prior to Passover. [Jeremias argues that this was only a loose expression and that it had no precise chronological significance in I Cor 15:20.]
9. It has been suggested by various writers that as many as ten of the activities described as occurring on the day of Jesus’ death could not have happened on the day after the Passover meal due to its quasi-Sabbath character. [Jeremias disposes of several of these objections, but is unable to eliminate them all.]
10. The witness of the fourth gospel is a powerful argument against the Markan scenario. One or the other must be wrong? [Jeremias has no convincing reply to this objection, but tries to argue that John’s chronology was based on theological premises rather than historical accuracy.]
11. The Quartodeciman practices are used by both Jeremias and his critics, with both sides seeing their views reinforced by the observance in these circles of a Christian Passover on Nisan 15. This will be addressed again shortly.

From the immediately preceding discussion, it can be seen that while Jeremias is able to dispose of some of the most common objections to his thesis that the Last Supper was a Passover meal, he is unable to refute them all. Some remain open questions, while others continue to pose significant question marks over his views. In addition, most of his original fourteen considerations are subject to question when examined closely. Indeed, all but the fourteenth seem to be rather insecure, and even it does not command universal acceptance.

The location of the meal in Jerusalem and the ease with which a room was obtained scarcely need detain us. If Jesus often spent nights in prayer at the Mount of Olives (as Luke 21:37 and 22:39 state) then not only was his trip there far from unusual on this night, but he presumably was frequently in the city, of an evening, and had at least one house where he could count on a welcome and a ready room. Similarly, the significance of the evening time of the meal, the use of wine and of the postures adopted has been decisively dismissed by Dugmore.⁷ The point made by Jeremias concerning a reference to levitical purity in John 13:10 seems to be an unnatural interpretation of the text, and one which results in an uncharacteristic concern for purity on Jesus’ part; while the assumption that red wine was involved in the Last Supper narratives is quite gratuitous.

As these points slip one by one from Jeremias’ grasp, the compelling force of his remaining arguments is proportionally weakened. Some, like the disciples’ mistaken assumption about Judas’ mission and the giving of alms to the poor, or the singing of a hymn, are consistent with the meal’s having been a Passover if it

could be established on other grounds, but they fail to carry conviction on their own. Furthermore, the literary character of these texts makes one wary of arguing too closely about such matters as the time in the meal when Jesus said the words over the bread. Finally, not even the argument of which Jeremias is most confident, namely the relationship between the words of institution and the explanatory sayings in the Passover Seder, carries that much weight. Kuhn has demonstrated that Jeremias' argument is weak even at this point, and that the links between the words of institution and Seder are so ephemeral as to be evidence against the paschal character of the Last Supper.⁸

In addition to the points already mentioned, there are several others which deserve brief consideration as they underline the need to exercise caution in accepting the consensus view based on Jeremias' work.

The first concerns the non-familial character of the group at the Last Supper. If a Passover was being celebrated it would seem strange that none of the members of the household, in whose (presumably best) room Jesus and his disciples were meeting, were present. Not only were they missing, but so were the circle of intimate friends from Bethany, as well as Mary, mother of the Lord, and the other women disciples who had accompanied Jesus from Galilee. They were certainly around the next day — as would be expected if that were the Passover and they had come into the city to join up with Jesus and the Twelve for its observance — but they were notably absent from the Last Supper.

A further point concerns the deserted streets on the evening of the Passover. If the city was packed with pilgrims and they were all celebrating with their lambs and their cups of wine, why were the streets so deserted that Jesus could be arrested without any fuss? Again, they were clearly present next morning in large numbers and they quickly became aware of and involved in the trial proceedings. Is this because they had come into the city for the preparations for the Passover, whereas the previous night they were not so engaged?

The priestly desire to get rid of Jesus "before the festival" should not be dismissed as lightly as Jeremias tries to do. He attempts an artificial translation chosen for its accommodation to his own theory rather than its linguistic value, and reinforces this with the comment that the fact of such an intention does not demonstrate that it was fulfilled in practice.⁹ This is true, but fails to take account of the insight, attributed to Wellhausen, that the disciples would hardly have been privy to the secret plans of the priests and that Mark 14:1-2 presumably represents the conclusion deduced by the early church from the actual course of events, namely the arrest, trial and death of Jesus "before the festival".¹⁰

The possible significance of the Quartodeciman Passover observances was noted earlier, and can be commented upon at a little more length now. Lohse established, in his studies earlier this century, that the Quartodeciman practice of keeping a Christian Passover on Nisan 15 and fasting on Nisan 14 went back to

Palestine in the early period of the church.¹¹ While he and Jeremias saw these practices as evidence for the Last Supper's having been a Passover meal, Ogg has recently challenged that assumption.¹² Ogg points out that the Quartodecimans fasted on Nisan 14 because that was the day they remembered as the day of Jesus' death. That is, the Quartodeciman Passover observances included a commemoration of Jesus' death as happening the day prior to the Passover: the same chronology found in John.

The final argument against the paschal character of the Last Supper which will be considered in this paper concerns the date of the Last Supper itself. Once again, the work of Ogg is important.¹³ Ogg has established that in the years 26-36 CE, the period of Pontius Pilate's term of office in Palestine, there were only two occasions when either Nisan 14 or Nisan 15 fell on a Friday. On both 7 April 30 and 3 April 33, Nisan 14 fell on a Friday, and on no other occasions did either date coincide with a Friday. Of these, the earlier date seems most probably for the death of Jesus, but in either case the synoptic chronology which places the Last Supper on the evening of the Passover meal is ruled out.

III

Contrary to the consensus view on the subject, it is clear that a good case can be established for the view that the Last Supper was not a Passover meal and that it was more likely to have been an ordinary meal held on the evening prior to the Passover. Possibly it was held in the room whose availability for the next evening's meal had been secured and in which the preparations for the Passover were well advanced.¹⁴

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the meal may have taken on paschal overtones in the minds of the early church, especially given the paschal elements in the early traditions about the death of Jesus. The mere fact that Jesus' death actually occurred at Passover time would have almost made those associations inevitable, but the inherent religious themes of the festival also made it a rich mine to plumb for insights into the significance of Jesus' death. In the mind of the first Christians, the festival of Israel's redemption had become the occasion of redemption for all. These paschal overtones need not be an embarrassment in the post-Jeremias interpretation of the Last Supper and the events of that first Easter. They can, in fact, add new depths to the interpretation of Christ's death and its commemoration in the liturgy.¹⁵

All involved knew it was Passover time. Like children on Christmas eve, the characters in the story of Jesus' death are aware of the imminent festival. *Jesus* was conscious that it was that time of year, the time when God's people re-lived their salvation by God. *The disciples* knew it was that time of year, and asked Jesus what arrangements he wanted made for the festival. (An ironic question, when considered at a deeper level.) *The crowd* knew that it was Passover time.

They had packed into the city and were buzzing with talk about this Galilean. Was he the one to free them from Rome? *The priests and scribes* knew it well, also. They were plotting to get rid of him before things got out of hand. Even *the Romans* knew it was Passover time. They had extra personnel on hand to cope with any trouble, and Pilate was anxious to keep things under control.

Nisan 15 that year was to be the day when a lot of big themes came together in Jerusalem, themes whose conjunction Christians celebrate each Maundy Thursday and Good Friday. The day of preparation for the Passover was to see these major biblical themes interacting:—

- * the desperate need for God to save his people
- * the love of Israel's God for his people
- * direct intervention by God to rescue his people
- * a covenant, initiated by God, between him and his people
- * a special meal eaten just before the experience of deliverance
- * the death of the king's firstborn as the power of evil is broken

Given the conjunction of those religious themes, it would have been difficult for the death of Jesus at Passover time not to have been interpreted as a fulfillment of OT hopes and aspirations, or for its paschal associations not to have been realised.

When seeking a way to interpret the Eucharist, theologians have often looked to the Last Supper as establishing some form of paradigm. The Supper clearly has such a paradigmatic function, but its significance does not need to be restricted to the supposed paschal character of the meal. Indeed, the Last Supper can still be seen to have rich associations with the Passover tradition even when clearly distinguished from the Passover. It seems especially pertinent that worshippers on Maundy Thursday evening should be reminded that, like the Jews in Egypt, the disciples ate their special meal not as a memorial of past salvation but as an anticipation of salvation yet to be enjoyed.

While the Eucharist is often interpreted in terms of its past reference, with considerable debate at times over such issues as the concept of sacrifice, the meaning of *anamnesis*, etc. it may also be interpreted in terms of its future reference and this can most easily be done in the liturgy on Maundy Thursday evening. At this celebration of the Eucharist, more than any other celebration, the worshipper is directed to look ahead to the salvation which is coming rather than backwards to a past event. Just as the hurried meal in Egypt was a preparation for the Passover deliverance to come that night, so the Last Supper can usefully be thought of as a meal in preparation for the deliverance to be achieved next day as the Lamb was slaughtered and his blood shed. The natural sequences of Bible and Liturgy agree: the meal precedes the salvation, the supper precedes the cross, Maundy Thursday precedes Good Friday, our participation

in the Eucharist precedes new experiences of God's salvation operative in our lives.

The Eucharist, whose roots go back in part to that meal "on the night that he was betrayed", shares many connections and associations with the Passover, even though the Last Supper itself was not in fact a Passover meal. In our contemporary commemoration of Christ's passion and death in the liturgy of Maundy Thursday evening and Good Friday it is proper to develop and exploit those paschal overtones. However, this does not necessitate such liturgical oddities as Christians keeping a Jewish Passover Seder or, worse still, devising a so-called "Christian Passover". This is to confuse the biblical data and to complicate the liturgical witness to Christ's death. The proper paschal elements might be better developed, following the ancient Quartodeciman practice, by observing a Seder style of service on the evening of Good Friday as a commemoration of the Christian Pascha. Such a service, were it possible, might be a more appropriate liturgical commemoration of the death of "Christ, our Passover lamb" than some of the "Solemn Liturgy of the Passion" services which are now performed on that day.

The paschal elements are deeply woven into the timing and meaning of the death of Jesus, and they can be celebrated without confusing the commemoration of his death with the mythical Passover of the Last Supper. Instead, the Eucharist which Christ gives us, and in which he gives us himself, can be affirmed and celebrated on these days more than any others as an action in which we look forward to the coming of God's kingdom, in which we are prepared for that coming, and in which we willingly take up the cost of being instruments of the kingdom's coming.

Mark relates that Jesus spoke of that kingdom at the Last Supper, and expressed his longing for its coming. The Jews in Egypt ate their meal and set out into the liberty of God's children. The disciples in Jerusalem ate their meal and set off, unwittingly at the time, on the way of the cross. Similarly, on a Maundy Thursday evening we break bread together and move off into the future where God's salvation awaits, moving from Maundy Thursday through the paschal offering of Christ on Good Friday to the dawning of the new age on Easter Day. While the link is not to be found in the nature of the Last Supper, there is a real association of Passover and Maundy Thursday which should be clearly reflected in our liturgy.

NOTES

1. An extensive bibliography may be found in my 1978 Master's dissertation for the University of Queensland, "The Last Supper and the Passover", 207-214. The major studies include: G.J. Bahr, "Seder of Passover and the eucharistic words" *NovT* 12(1970)181-202; F.C. Burkitt, "The Last Supper and the Paschal Meal" *JTS* 17(1916)292-297; R.J. Daly, "The Eucharist and Redemption. The Last Supper and Jesus' Understanding of His Death" in *Biblical Theology*

- Bulletin* 11(1981)21-27; J. Delorme (ed.), *The Eucharist in the New Testament* (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1964); C.W. Dugmore, "Study of the Origins of the Eucharist: retrospect and reevaluation" in G.J. Cuming (ed.), *Studies in Church History, II* (London: Nelson, 1965) 1-18; A. Gilmour, "The Date and Significance of the Last Supper" *SJT* 14(1961)256-269; J.K.M. Howard, "Passover and Eucharist in the Fourth Gospel" *SJT* 20(1967)329-337; J. Jeremias, *Die Abendmahlswoorte Jesu* (3rd edition; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960) [Engl. trans.: *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (with author's revisions to 1964; London: SCM, 1966)]; K.G. Kuhn, "The Lord's Supper and the Communal Meal at Qumran" in K. Stendahl (ed.), *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1958) 65-93; A.R.C. Leaney, "What was the Last Supper?" *Theology* 70(1967)52-62; G. Ogg, "The Chronology of the Last Supper" in *Historicity and Chronology in the New Testament* (SPCK Theological Collections, 6; London: SPCK, 1965) 75-96; R. Pesch, *Das Abendmahl und Jesu Todesverständnis* (Quaestiones Disputatae, 80; Freiburg: Herder, 1978); R. Pesch, "Abendmahl und Jesu Todesverständnis" in K. Kertelge (ed.), *Der Tod Jesu. Deutungen im Neuen Testament* (Quaestiones Disputatae, 74; Freiburg: Herder, 1976); and H. Schurmann, *Der Paschamahlbericht Lk 22,(7-14) 15-18.* (NTAbh 19/5; Munster: Aschendorff, 1955).
2. For discussion of the issues involved see C.E.B. Cranfield, *The Gospel according to St Mark* (Cambridge Greek Testament; Cambridge: CUP, 1959); S.E. Johnson, *A Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Mark* (BNTC; 2nd edition; London: A & C Black, 1972); E. Schweizer, *The Good News according to Mark* (London: SPCK, 1971); V. Taylor, *The Gospel according to St. Mark* (2nd edition; London: Macmillan, 1966).
 3. In addition to the standard commentaries, there is an extensive literature on the text, structure and meaning of Luke's account of the Last Supper. The literature and issues are considered in my "Last Supper and the Passover", 56-107.
 4. 1:29,36 describe Jesus as the "lamb of God"; 2:13-22 retains the Passover association of the cleansing of the temple and relates Jesus' actions in the temple to his death; 6:1ff uses Passover time as the setting for the multiplication of the loaves and the bread of life discourse; 11:55-57 notes the imminence of Passover; 12:1 provides a chronological reference to the sixth day before the Passover; in 12:20 certain "Greeks" who have come to Jerusalem for the Passover ask to see Jesus; at 13a:1 the Last Supper is dated to the day before Passover; 18:28 mentions the desire of the Jewish priests to maintain their necessary ritual purity because it was Passover that day; 18:39 refers to the tradition of releasing a prisoner at Passover time; 19:14,42 speak of Jesus' trial being held on the "day of Preparation of the Passover".
 5. The detailed discussion of these matters can be found in *Eucharistic Words*, 41-62.
 6. *Ibid.*, 62-84.
 7. Cf "Origins of the Eucharist", 6f. Overall, Dugmore is very sceptical of Jeremias' case and concludes: "The most that can be said is that Jeremias has made it less impossible to believe that the Last Supper was a Passover meal; he is very far from having proved that it was." ("Origins", 7f).
 8. "The Lord's Supper", 83f.
 9. *Eucharistic Words*, 71.
 10. Wellhausen's view is cited by R. H. Lightfoot, and described by him as "shrewd", in *History and Interpretation in the Gospels* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1935) 132.
 11. B. Lohse, *Das Passafest und der Quartodecimaner* (Gutersloh: 1953).
 12. See *Eucharistic Words*, 83f for Jeremias' use of the Quartodeciman material. Ogg ["Chronology", 89-92] counters this view.
 13. G. Ogg, "Chronology", 92-96. See also Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 36-41, where the 2nd edition adopts a different stance from earlier German and English editions and Jeremias reluctantly accepts that the evidence drawn from studies of astronomy and ancient calendars does not support the synoptic dating.

14. This, at least, was the view of F.C. Burkitt ["Last Supper", 295] who concluded: "I do not think there is any Jewish ceremony, binding or optional, to which the Last Supper corresponds, beyond the obvious binding duty of Grace before eating and drinking."
15. In a recent study ["The Early Eucharist: The Jewish Background" *Irish Theological Quarterly* 4a7(1980)34-42] R. Moloney, who also denies that the Last Supper was a Passover meal, says: "This is not to say however that the Passover is not relevant to Eucharistic theology. Perhaps we might put it this way: if Passover and Eucharist are not of the same species, they both belong to the same genus, namely that of Jewish ritual memorial. The Passover is one of the clearest, though not the only instance of this Jewish ritual memorial. Consequently it can be of great assistance in illustrating the nature of the Eucharist as an objective memorial of Christ's death and resurrection."

HEAVEN ON EARTH “DOWN UNDER” Experiencing Heaven through earthly realities

Miltiades Chryssavgis

‘Rejoice, O heavens,
sound the trumpets,
O foundations of the earth,
thunder forth gladness,
O mountains’. (Troparion.
Vespers Tone 1)

‘Beer is religion in Australia’, humourist Cyril Pearl once wrote.¹ A cynical comment? or a subconscious endeavour to transcend human thirst in search of fulfilment and fullness of life? Of course, very few people will deny the traditional importance of beer, with its social dimension of communal relationships, in the life of the majority of Australian people. But is it legitimate to assert that beer is religion in Australia? or rather, can it be said that, far from being simplistically materialistic, Cyril Pearl’s remark implies the reality of a much deeper, spiritual thirst, that is complementary to, and forms a single and united whole together with, the physical thirst for beer, or any other drink for that matter?

In his *For the Life of the World*, the late Alexander Schmemmann has drawn a parallel statement, similar to Cyril Pearl’s remark. He writes that ‘man is what he eats’,² and substantiates his statement by the biblical account of creation in which the human person is presented primarily ‘as hungry being, and the whole world as his food.’³ One must *eat* and *drink* in order to live — a notion that culminates in the Eucharist of the New Testament Church and extends to every meal where people are gathered to celebrate God’s gift of eating and drinking. Willingly or otherwise, Cyril Pearl was in effect confessing a basic truth, that makes all creation the symbol of His presence and revelation. The fact that this biblical notion is not fully understood or is frequently misunderstood or even habitually abused by many people does not really detract from the truth as such. When received as God’s gifts, eating and drinking aim at regaining and restoring the fullness of life, which Jesus Christ offers to all in the liturgical celebration of both heaven and earth.⁴

The Church should not hesitate to use all kinds of material means in order to express and live the realities for which they stand in relation to God, in relation to the cosmic environment and in relation to the heavenly Kingdom. For material things, by reason of God’s uncreated grace that dwells in them, reveal for us an epiphany, a manifestation of God’s presence in our midst. The entire world, which God created *ex nihilo* and out of love for humankind, is indeed ‘very good’,⁵ despite the confusion and loss of balance effected by its downfall. The

original relationship in the creation, involving the Creator and the created in a liturgical celebration, still remains at the basis of all life and constitutes the very essence of all existence. The Orthodox notion of the uncreated light permeates the whole world and transcends everything right up to the last speck of dust through what Gregory Palamas (d.1359) calls ‘uncreated divine energies or operations’, which emanate from the Holy Trinity and constitute the reason for the existence of everything in the entire universe. John of Damascus (d.750) expresses the same notion in the following beautiful troparion of the Paschal Kanon:

Now all things have been filled with light, both Heaven and earth and the subterranean regions; let the entire creation, therefore, celebrate the Rising of Christ, in whom it is firmly established.⁶

It is this uncreated light, glory and holiness of God that people are called to experience and to celebrate together with the entire creation. They are invited to do this within the liturgical life of the Church and to transform the whole world into the ‘new creation’ of the ‘kingdom to come’, which is to be experienced as a reality even now, not because they deserve it, but because God has granted it as a gift for them and for the world.

The purpose of this article is to throw some light on the question of living the liturgy and experiencing the mystery of the risen Christ in every detail of life. If the whole world is the abode of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the liturgy of our life, namely our encounter with God the Father in and through the Son Jesus Christ, acquires a cosmic dimension and includes all aspects of life and of the world in which we live.

The human person is first of all a liturgical creature and becomes fully and truly human in the very act of glorifying, praising and worshipping God, the ‘Creator of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.’⁷ In this act of worship all the elements of the world are included and actively involved: ‘the heavens rejoice, the foundations of the earth sound the trumpets and the mountains thunder forth gladness,’ as the Church proclaims in an ancient hymn.⁸ Since the Lord Jesus was clothed with a material body, all matter has potentially become Spirit-bearing and the entire universe becomes the Church, in which the Lord and His people interact in the joint journey of life towards the Kingdom. Christ is with His people at the start of the journey and also awaits them at the end of the journey towards the Kingdom.

Seen in this perspective, liturgical life is not just one aspect of the Church expressed in its services; rather, it covers the entire life in the wider image of the whole world as the Church. The whole creation is given by God to be loved and shared in thanksgiving: the world, matter, time, all aspects of human life reveal the epiphany of God, his manifestation in the world. Each element of nature,

each substance of life, is a little epiphany because each substance with its own existence proclaims God; and the entire material world is nothing other than a transparent veil through which people may see, feel, hear, taste and communicate with God. It is for this reason that the tendency to oppose spiritual and material, sacred and profane should be avoided. On the other hand, extremes of nature, such as the vastness of the Australian land and the harshness of its environment, should be welcomed as encounters with the Unknown. Furthermore, the ample opportunities afforded by natural resources and the frequent failures effected by the wild elements of nature should be received as tests of human character in the struggle to meet the Wholly Other through a series of challenges. The peaceful and endless desert of Australia's interior should find access into the heart of its overcrowded cities, as catalyst of all kinds of noise and pollution. Coming to terms with the frequent alternation of the four seasons in one day, experiencing the disasters of flood, fire and drought, and living in the openness of land, sea and sky, should be accepted as an opportunity and test to discover God's plan for human life, its destiny and ultimate place in the kingdom.

Nature and the entire universe is like a book by which people may perceive the essence of created things and so discover the Creator present in everything as the cause and sustainer of all things. This is not to suggest pantheism, but to affirm His presence through his uncreated energies that constitute the essence of all created things. The discovery of God through the natural phenomena in Australia is often an unthankful task as it meets with repeated failure. Yet it will only continue to be a challenge for Australians if they experience it within their culture and environment. It is through nature that one is guided to an understanding of the Mysteries of God. For 'ever since God created the world, his invisible qualities, both his eternal power and his divine nature, have been clearly seen; they are perceived in the things that God has made' (Rom. 1:20).

If *liturgy* means a living relationship between the people and God and if it is to reflect the radiance of Christian faith in daily life by means of all that is available in the world, then our perception of liturgical life should transcend the symbols of the created world in an endeavour to experience a transfigured life in Christ the God-Man. If the *liturgy* means the celebration of the epiphany of God in the incarnated God-Man Jesus Christ, then we must perceive such epiphany or manifestation of God in every event of human life, in every aspect of created life within the cosmic frame in which people live. For the material creation in the Australian environment speaks to people directly and spontaneously, or rather God speaks to them through the very events of history or the elements of nature that they frequently despise.

Such a cosmic dimension that embraces the entire life, culture and environment in the quest for the knowledge of God on the part of humanity must presuppose two basic conditions. First, in order to decipher correctly every

epiphany of God in nature, the *liturgy* of the world must be experienced within the body of the Church, within the communion of saints, within the perspective of the kingdom. This last point brings us to the second presupposition of experiencing the *liturgy* eschatologically, *sub specie aeternitatis*, against the perspective of the future life, which has already been granted to us because of Christ's incarnation. The former condition guarantees the proper climate and basis for evaluating the world from a healthy and balanced spiritual perspective in order to appreciate the sanctity and goodness of all matter, while the latter liberates all from the habitual attachment to things of this passing world and enables people to live *in* this world, yet not be *of* this world. In this endeavour, thirst and hunger for fulfilment in God begins with symbols of the creation and is attained by overcoming human goals and 'by bringing to God the world for the life of which He gave His Son'.⁹

The popular reference ascribed to Australian people as habitual beer drinkers, as posed at the outset of this article, may at first seem insignificant and even trivial for the purposes of a study on liturgy and life. It was the aim of this paper to indicate, in a somewhat cursory way, precisely the opposite. For every aspect of the material creation, no matter how trivial or insignificant by human standards, can prove a potential agent or a tangible symbol of the manifestation of God in human life. Christian life denotes a constant movement, a continual ascent towards the ultimate homeland beyond all earthly realities. Yet, it is only through and in these realities of human life, it is only within a specified time and in a concrete land and its culture, that such movement and ascent is incarnated and becomes possible, by transcending the human limits of existential concerns and social activism and by meeting, in faith and love, the infinite transcendence of God.

NOTES

1. Quoted in *Australia Reaching Out*, Auge International, Japan, 1987, p. 92.
2. A. Schmemmann, *For the Life of the World*, S.V.S., U.S.A., 1973, p. 11.
3. cf. Genesis 1:29.
4. cf. John 10:10b.
5. cf. Genesis 1:18.
6. Troparion, First Ode, Easter Kanon.
7. Article One of Nicene Creed.
8. Vespers Troparion, Tone 1.
9. A. Schmemmann, *For the Life of the World*, p. 151.

NEWS AND INFORMATION

THE 1987 CONGRESS OF SOCIETAS LITURGICA

The International Congress of Societas Liturgica meets every other year. In 1987 the venue was the Cusanus Akademie in Brixen, Italy. While southern Italy baked in summer heat, and there was even worse heat in Greece, the weather in the South Tyrol was kind. The clear air of this farming and tourist region, and the arresting scenery in all directions, provided an ideal environment for worship, study and consultation.

The theme of the 11th Congress was "A Worshipping Church, Penitent and Reconciling". The president, Fr Robert Taft SJ, gave a splendid summary of the topic in his opening address "Penance in Contemporary Scholarship". The second session was something of a marathon, with five contributions to the subject "Penance in the Churches: current practice and experience". Each speaker gave a denominational perspective: Anglican, Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and ERvangelical were covered.

Other papers were "The Church's Ministry of Reconciliation: a service to humanity throughout the ages" (Georg Kretschmar); "The Need to be Reconciled: contemporary non-ecclesial forms of reconciliation" (Karl-Heinrich Bieritz); "Salvation, or Reconciliation, and its Sacramental Realizations" (Paul de Clerck); "The Reconciliation of Divided Churches: a witness to the Gospel" (Geoffrey Wainwright).

It was clear that changes are taking place in almost all the confessional groups of the Church. There was general agreement that a balance between personal confession of sin and corporate confession is needed. There was also a widespread feeling that disciplines for admission to the eucharist need reconsideration by the churches. There was less agreement on the question of the appropriate means of achieving reconciliation within denominations and between denominations.

The proceedings of the Congress, including the papers, will be published by *Studia Liturgica* in the latter part of 1988. There will in future be an even closer link between the Society and the journal than heretofore. The journal has struggled to survive, and the new link should give it a firmer basis.

There will be a wealth of material for reflection when this issue on penance and reconciliation appears. And the problems of the various churches are very similar, despite the differences of historical experience. In today's ecumenical context, the problems of the christian church anywhere are the problems of christians everywhere, not just because of the speed of international travel, migration and communication, but because denominational distance is much

less great than it was. As many have noted, there are greater differences within particular denominations, culturally, theologically and ethically, than there are between denominations.

The Societas itself is undergoing changes too. The representation of women, while still small, was greater at this Congress than ever before. There was a sprinkling of Orthodox, Asians and Latin Americans. Slowly the Societas is moving away from American and Western European dominance. But only two Australians took part this time.

The new president of the Societas, in succession to Robert Taft, is Canon Donald Gray of Westminster Abbey. He is scheduled to preside at the 12th Congress to be held in York, England, 14th-19th August 1989.

D'Arcy Wood

INTERNATIONAL LITURGY ASSEMBLY 1988

Over six hundred people gathered in Hobart on the 24th January to celebrate the International Liturgy Assembly. These people represented many facets of the Australian Church — predominately Catholic, they came as lay person, religious, priest or bishop. It was tremendous to meet the diocesan or parish groups that came, empowered and financed by their group. We all gathered in the University of Tasmania Theatre on Sunday evening a little apprehensive of what the week would bring.

The first full day of work was given over to six papers on aspects of Australian society — in one sense these papers left a feeling of pessimism in many of the participants; the Aboriginal plea to “wait for us as we find our place in this world”, the complex web of bio-technology challenging our definition of being (and our judging) human persons, the search for Australian identity in the image-word of poet, writer and sociologist, and the final challenge to us by the painter to reflect — not by mere words, but by inviting us to meditate!

The evening led into the first keynote address by Cardinal Hume on “The People of God”. This paper, coming at the end of a long day of many papers, was an empowering reminder by the pastor of the diocese of Westminster that the Church is founded on the people transformed by the waters of Baptism into the living experience of interdependence — “communio”. Baptism establishes our right and duty to share in the priestly, prophetic and kingly roles of Christ. This is the basis for the apostolate of the people of God. (That night many of us could only hear the Cardinal giving “a theological statement drawn from the tested sources of Scripture and Tradition!” It was not till the end of the week that

the pastoral vision of this man shone through his words.) The night closed in prayer — creatively and reflectively sustained by the leadership of Fr. Michael Joncas.

After a break to celebrate Australia Day, we returned expectantly to the assembly for three days of lectures, responses and prayer. The papers hopefully will be made available in print or on tapes. What I carried away from these papers was the interaction among the participants — it was exciting to see the fruits of the work undertaken by Archbishop Young twenty years ago when he had returned from the Council willing to share with his diocese the vision and hopes of the liturgical reform of the Council; obviously the three hundred participants from the Church of Hobart had been formed by their Bishop many years ago in their love and enthusiasm for the liturgical life of their Church and so could gain much from the interaction of the Assembly; a situation contrasted with my own diocese's representation by three priests.

All of these words and papers were held together by the prayer and hospitality of the Assembly. Many of the artists who serve our Australian Church (as artists in music, visual arts, performing arts or presiding) were present during the Conference — unfortunately most of their talent was not made available to the Assembly except in a limited way in the workshops of the second last day. The situation was noted by many of the participants.

In summary, the Assembly was a valuable gathering of a diversity of the persons who contribute to forming the Catholic Church in Australia. The Assembly seemed to inspire hope and confidence in many of the participants. Some would have hoped that a greater part of the time would have been spent on highlighting issues and solutions from the wealth of liturgical experience present in the participants. However, it is hoped that it will not take another twenty years for the Australian Church to gather for the next national liturgical assembly.

David Orr, OSB

BOOK REVIEWS

RECONCILIATION: SACRAMENT WITH A FUTURE

by Sandra DeGidio, O.S.M.; Cincinnati, U.S.A., St. Anthony Messenger Press,
1985. Pp. 105 \$US4.95

Sandra DeGidio, being aware of the negativity with which many Roman Catholics view Confession, beckons her readers to explore, with renewed courage and confidence, the Roman Church's teaching on and expression of the new Rite of Reconciliation. Sandra, like a competent and caring parent, takes the hand of the sceptical and even frightened reader and leads him or her into the dazzling potential of that sacrament which promises healing and hope. In the introduction she says:

Reconciliation is best understood as a sacrament that celebrates the reality that human beings can grow, change, heal and be healed, forgive and be forgiven, renew themselves and their world, become more whole and blossom into greater beauty. (p. 4)

As a non-Roman Catholic reader, who has not had to consider the ritual practice of Confession, I was delighted with the sensitive and yet provocative way in which Sr DeGidio led me both into and through an exposition of the history, theology and practice of the new Rite of Reconciliation.

The book's format, as much as its content, contributes to its clarity. The seven chapters clearly define the author's interest and direction. The chapters cover the following subjects:

1. Revising Rites, Renewing People
2. Our Shared History: Reconciliation Through the Ages
3. New Rite, New Name, New Attitude
4. The Three C's of Reconciliation
5. Contemporary Portraits of Sin and Morality
6. Reconciliation and Us
7. The Future of Sacramental Reconciliation: Personal Predictions.

Of the book's many insights, I will mention four, which are of central importance to the new Rite: i) the Church's commitment to ritual revision; ii) the sacrament of reconciliation as covenant, not law; iii) 'sin' as a relational condition; and iv) 'reconciliation': a life-process, understood in the three C's of the sacrament.

The organising centre which holds together the distinctive foci of the chapters is the belief that:

sacraments are the ritual expression of human experience; when our rituals do not speak to our experiences they are meaningless and require change. (p. 19)

Thus, the new Rite of Reconciliation, 1973, demonstrates the Church's commitment to the revision of its rituals in the light of contemporary cultural and religious experience.

The single most important change in the Church's understanding of the sacrament since Vatican II is the conscious shift from conceiving reconciliation in terms of law to that of covenant:

The basic moral teaching of the Bible about sin and reconciliation was not law, we discovered, but covenant — between God and God's people (p. 35)

And so, with this radically different understanding of reconciliation firmly in place, the author enters into a compelling exposition of the nature of sin (chapter 5) and humanity's need for forgiveness and absolution (chapter 3).

'Sin', the author states, 'is violating people'. It is to do with relationships and the quality of life, rather than with law and quantifying sinful actions. Consistent with her treatment of 'sin', Sandra also understands 'reconciliation' in terms of relationships and the quality of one's life:

It is a life-style, a mission, a ministry, a lifelong process in which all of us as Church are constantly and intimately involved. (p. 43)

She interprets this 'lifelong process' of reconciliation according to the model of God's love disclosed in the story of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32). She identifies three movements in the process of reconciliation which she names the 'Three C's of Reconciliation — Conversion, Confession and Celebration'. These three activities are present in the sacramental action. But above all, she says, reconciliation is 'a matter of love'. (p. 76)

Clearly, Sandra DeGidio has a unique contribution to make to the Church's teaching on, and expression of, the new Rite of Reconciliation. She is personally excited by her subject and she creates in her reader a similar sense of excitement. And although the author writes primarily for a Roman Catholic audience I believe her treatment of the subject is pertinent for the Reformed tradition and for ecumenical conversation. I also believe that this book provides the church with many creative ideas for shaping its sacramental life in accordance with Christ's ministry of reconciliation, for:

The Church exists precisely to proclaim and carry on the reconciling work of Christ in today's world, to be a sign of the Reconciling Saviour. (p. 46).

This relatively small but concise book (only 105 pages) offers itself as an excellent introductory text: for students of sacramental theology and liturgy; particularly for members of the Academy preparing for the 1988 Conference the theme of which is to be Reconciliation; or, for anyone, who wishes to rediscover the potential of the Sacrament of Reconciliation, which:

... is truly a new Rite of Spring through which the Church and each one of us — can be continually renewed. (p. 4).

Jennifer Farrell

DUTY AND DELIGHT: ROUTLEY REMEMBERED

A Memorial Tribute to Erik Routley (1917-1982) Edited by Robin A. Leaver, James H. Litton and Carlton R. Young. Carol Stream, Illinois: Hope Publishing Company, Norwich, England: Canterbury Press 1985. Pp. xiv + 310

This collection of articles was compiled as a memorial tribute to the person and work of the late Erik Routley, 1917-1982. The editors' intention was to demonstrate the profound influence Routley, as a minister and musician, had on the development of church music and hymnody in Great Britain and the United States of America. To this end they commissioned several well-known scholars to write on aspects of church music which would reflect Routley's influence and also contribute to the ongoing discussion on church music.

There are fourteen articles by seventeen authors, varying in style and content, from scholarly essays to personal reflections, all of which admirably portray the capacity and complexity of Eric Routley. The articles are arranged in three sections which mark Dr Routley's chief concerns about church music. The three sections, (i) Ministry of the Word (ii) Ministry of Music and (iii) Ministry of Hymnody, follow two articles by Robin A. Leaver and J. Litton, and Caryl Micklem, acclaiming Routley's persuasive personal and professional demeanour. An extensive bibliography completes the volume.

SECTION I: *Ministry of the Word*

This section contains three essays all of which highlight some aspect of Eric's pivotal concern in ministry — 'to advance the Kingdom of God'. (p. 19) George Caird in his essay, 'Perfection and Grace' recognises the inevitable tension that arises for both preacher and musician when their desire to achieve the 'ideal performance' in worship is not fulfilled. Their search for perfection needs to be guided and shaped by grace. Don Saliers explores what it means for people to live in and worship as community in contemporary society. Robin A. Leaver leads on into a study of the intimate relation between theology and music about which he says: 'the intertwining duet of music and theology form the substance of Biblical theology' (p. 48).

SECTION II: *Ministry of Music*

Of the four articles in this section, the essay by Carlton R. Young, 'An Alternative Model for the Education of the Church Musician', seemed to me the most useful. He offers a constructive model of church-music education which aims 'to bring together the three components of the 'impasse' in music: music/performance, theological studies, practical ministries' (p. 98). The other three articles by Ruth Micklem, Alec Wyton, and Paul W. Wohlgenuth, consider the potential shape of the ministry of music in the United States.

SECTION III: *Ministry of Hymnody*

It is in the seven articles of this section that we see the immense impact that

Routley had on the study and use of hymns in our time. This is ably demonstrated in the article by Ian Fraser on 'Beginnings at Dunblane'. In this article Fraser links the 'hymn-explosion' of the sixties with the working group at Dunblane of which he says Eric was 'the real catalyst and inspirer'. The Dunblane working method for selecting hymns for inclusion in the *Dunblane Praise* volumes 1 and 2 is analyzed and listed. The daring innovation of this method was to let the people themselves be the judges — 'confidence was given to ordinary folk to create and to evaluate' (p. 185).

Essays by Raymond Glover, James Litton, Russell Schulz-Widmar and the three British hymn-text writers, Fred Pratt Green, Fred Kaan and Brian Wren, comment on the current practice of hymnody in relation to liturgy and contemporary language forms. Alan Luff in his essay, 'A Welsh Carol and its Consequences', explores the way in which one tradition appropriates music from another with particular reference to the Welsh hymn tune OLWEN. John Wilson, in 'Looking at Hymn Tunes: the Objective Factors', establishes criteria by which one may judge the success of a hymn tune. Under the two broad categories of 'singability' and 'memorability' he identifies four attributes that contribute to make a good hymn tune: melodic outline, rhythm, harmony and structure.

A comprehensive bibliography of the works of Routley by Ray Robinson completes this memorial volume. The contents of the bibliography are arranged in seven sections and include: works about Routley by other authors, Routley's own publications and his unpublished works. This bibliography is of insatiable value to all who are involved in the study and practice of church music.

The volume is a worthy memorial tribute to an outstanding man, minister and musician. Ruth Micklem draws an apt portrait of this impressive man when she says:

Each aspect of him was memorable: his music, his mind, his energy, his personality, his faith: each on its own would have made him unique, together they produced something almost impossible to convey to any one who did not know him. (p. 67)

This memorial volume commands a place on our book-shelves next to Routley's many other works, thereby completing his life's work — 'in praise of God meet duty and delight...?'

Jennifer Farrell

CONTRIBUTORS AND REVIEWERS

The Very Revd Miltiades Chryssavgis is Parish Priest of St George's Rose Bay and Chancellor of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Australia. Fr Chryssavgis is also Chaplain to St Andrew's Theological College, Sydney where he teaches liturgics and Byzantine music.

The Revd Jennifer Farrell is a Uniting Church minister who has a particular interest in music and liturgy. She is a member of the Australian Hymn Book Committee.

The Revd Gregory C. Jenks is Lecturer in Biblical Studies at St Barnabas' College, Adelaide and Director of Post-ordination Training for the Anglican Diocese of Adelaide. Fr Jenks teaches Biblical Studies for Adelaide College of Divinity and the Flinders University of South Australia.

The Revd David Orr, OSB, Assistant Editor of AJL, is a monk of St Benedict's Monastery, Arcadia and teaches liturgy for the Catholic Institute of Sydney.

The Revd Dr Charles H. Sherlock is Senior Lecturer in Theology and Worship at Ridley College, Melbourne and also teaches liturgiology at Trinity Theological School, Melbourne.

Dr Stan van Hooft is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Toorak Campus of Victoria College in Melbourne.

The Revd Dr H. D'Arcy Wood, President of the Academy, is Deputy Principal of Parkin-Wesley College, Adelaide. He teaches theology for Adelaide College of Divinity and The Flinders University of South Australia. Dr Wood is President of the Australian Council of Churches and Chairman of the Uniting Church's Commission on Liturgy.

AJL ADDRESSES

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Annual Subscription \$15.00

AJL is sent anywhere in the world for an annual subscription of AUS\$15.00 if paid in Australian currency. If paid in any other currency the subscription is the equivalent of AUS\$20.00.

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